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This thesis discusses the issues and circumstances present in
Burma which have complicated and frustrated U.S. counter-narcotics
efforts and overall U.S. policy in the past. The thesis attempts
to forecast the future of Burma and suggests needed reforms for
development. Potential U.S. policy is proposed which accounts for
the political instability and economic decline of Burma while
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I. INTRODUCTION:
A NATION IN TURMOIL
Burma is the largest country of continental Southeast
Asia. As a British colony, it was little known and of less
importance to the United States. Not until World War II was
the strategic importance of Burma recognized; the 'Burma road'
was acknowledged as instrumental in resupplying Chinese forces
fighting the Japanese during WWII. Hill tribes from Burma's
Shan state were used by the CIA during the post-war era to
gather intelligence information on mainland communist China.
During the past three decades, however, the country has had a
much greater impact on the United States from a very different
perspective. The flourishing narcotics industry of the
'Golden Triangle' is centered in the eastern region of Burma.
This thesis will discuss more than just the narcotics
industry of Burma; other factors are involved which have
helped entrench the trade and have complicated efforts to stop
the flow of heroin to the United States. These elements will
be discussed in detail to show the complex nature of the
overall turmoil enveloping Burma today. Future U.S. counter-
narcotics programs will be discussed in light of these
changing variables, and how the overall Burma policy must
incorporate these factors to be effective.
"Drugs have been used since civilization began for
medication, meditation, divination, and recreation. But at no
time in history has there been such grave concern--f rom heads
of state to the average citizen--over the epidemic nature of
drug abuse and the insidious social and financial consequences
of illicit trafficking, " Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar told the U.N. Economic and Social Council on May 24,
1985. "Illicit drugs, wherever they are produced or used,
contaminate and corrupt, weakening the very fabric of society.
These problems have already afflicted every region in the
world," he declared. 1
The narcotics industry imposes exceptional costs on the
economy of the United States, undermines our national values
and institutions, and is directly responsible for the
destruction and loss of many American lives. The
international traffic of illicit drugs constitutes a major




Narcotics have been deemed a major threat to our national
security in the 1990's. President Bush's policy paper,
published in August 1991, stressed the importance of drug
1986 International Narcotics Control Board Report,
"Yes to Life, No to Drugs", U.N. Chronicle (New York:
Department of Public Information; United Nations, VOL XXIV,
no. 3 (Aug 1987) , ii .
2 George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, August 1991), 1-31.
interdiction as part of his war on drugs. Most of the
interdiction efforts have been focused in Latin America and
South America because of their close proximity to the United
States and the flourishing narcotics trade in that region of
the world. However, other areas of the world are equally--and
in some ways more urgent--specif ically , the 'Golden Triangle'
,
in Southeast Asia.
In the past decade opium production records have been
broken almost every year in Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle.
The region currently accounts for 70% of the world's heroin.
The majority of production takes place in Burma, which
supplies as much as 60% of the U.S. demand for the "wonder
drug". The focus of this study will be directly related to
Burma, the complex factors which have contributed to the
horrific growth of the industry, and the measures which have
been, and are being taken to reverse the development of the
trade
.
Initial predictions are that Burma's 1991 crop of heroin
will exceed that of 1990, which the U.S. government estimates
put at 2,250 metric tons." As more "China White" heroin
reaches the U.S., street-level purity has increased from 3% to
as high as 35%. At that level it no longer has to be
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Mid-
year Update", United States Department of State; Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters (September 1991) 55. The
figures are not yet out for 1991, though this is already the
1992 growing season.
injected; it can be snorted or smoked, making heroin the drug
of choice among growing numbers of young Americans . According
to an unofficial U.S. government estimate, there are now
roughly 1 million heroin addicts in the U.S., or more than
twice the number reckoned during heroin's "heyday" of the
1960's and 1970's. 4
This complex problem has no simple solution; the
narcotics industry in Burma has become thoroughly entrenched
from years of unofficial complicity throughout the region.
Confused by broader issues, the security and stability of the
region is directly threatened. Civil war has raged throughout
the land since independence; economic turmoil has retarded
growth; political instability threatens to topple Burma's
government. The very future of Burma is in question; will the
present government be willing or able to take effective action
to arrest the recalcitrant issues which have induced the
cancerous growth of the opium industry? Or, is a change in
leadership required before a pragmatic solution can be
initiated?
Without a political settlement with the various ethnic
insurgencies, opium trafficking is likely to become further
entrenched in Burma. Even if such a settlement were achieved,
enforcement actions would need to be combined with economic
development to achieve long-term narcotics reductions. The
4 Hodding Carter IV, "King of the Jungle", M Inc. Vlll,
no. 6 (March 1991) 85.
recent U.S. enforcement-based assistance did little to
encourage a resolution to the insurgent dilemma, nor did it
address the economic quandary within Burma.
These issues have been addressed in and of themselves,
but with little or no association to the narcotics industry;
they are all interlinked, and none can be solved without
accompanied reforms in the other problem areas. To further
complicate counter-narcotics efforts, human rights violations
by the current Burmese Government have strained relations
between Burma and the international community. Without
progress in Burma's internecine politics, a resolution to the
opium trade will not be forthcoming. Veritable economic
reforms must also accompany any comprehensive counter-
narcotics program.
As the international effort to stop the flow of illegal
drugs increases, what are the implications and effects of
these efforts in Burma--the major source of opiates in the
heroin trade? Specifically, what counter-narcotics poli
should the United States adopt, and how will these policies
affect Burma's political, economic, and social situation?
The bleak picture in Burma today is the result of a
tangled web of complex problems and indifference, which, over
the years, has allowed the roots of a corrupt, misguided
government to wreak havoc. The economic decay, political
instability, and volatile security issues, which have
confounded past counter-narcotics policies, spring from
decades of serious neglect, mismanagement, and feudal power
struggles. Before discussing these issues, it is necessary to
first examine Burma's historical legacy to lay the foundation
for analysis; Chapter II will do that. Examining the violence
of past relationships, and the present animosity expressed
between ethnic rivals and the Burman majority, helps explain
the lack of cooperation between ethnic insurgents and the
comparative ineffectiveness of the various anti-government
groups. Further, this assessment will also provide a basis
from which the present day economic difficulties arise.
Chapter III will examine the reverberations the economic
turmoil has caused to other aspects of Burma's otherwise
unstable environment. Much of the political discontent among
the populace is based on the poor performance of the
government in the management of the economy. Why, for
instance, with such vast resources, is Burma a pauper among
nations? What policy decisions led to this distinction? What
changes or reforms must the government initiate to allow Burma
to advance?
Chapter IV will discuss the political unrest that has
swept Burma since independence. The events which have led to
the violence of today, and which will confound Burma's
progress in the future if allowed to continue unchecked. The
various parties involved will be considered for their part in
destabilizing Burma, or their potential to eliminate the
instability in the future. Finally, what impact has this
pandemonium had on the opium industry, if any?
Chapter V will discuss the narcotics industry— this, of
course, is central to the thesis. How did the industry become
so entrenched in the region? Who were the powers that made
its success possible, and under what conditions did its growth
thrive. Poppy cultivation, the various stages required in the
refining process, and distribution of the heroin to the
flourishing world market will be discussed to give perspective
to the industry. Essential to this portion of the thesis is
an understanding of who is involved and who controls the
industry, and, specifically, their motivations for their
involvement. Additionally, there are powers in Burma and the
region with an interest in seeing the opium industry continue
to prosper. Who are they, and what do they want?
Chapter VI will examine the Burmese Government's efforts
to eliminate the production of opium within its borders, and
to what extent their efforts have been able to claim success.
In addition, other issues and areas, seen by the government as
more pressing, will be discussed. What is their agenda, and
what strategy have they adopted see their ambitions to
fruition? What financial means of support have they secured,
and does this factor have any significant impact on domestic
affairs? Finally, given the brutality of the regime and its
misguided application of power, what are the chances for
success in its quest to bring peace to Burma.
Chapter VII will discuss the effect Burma has had, and is
having, on its neighbors and other international actors. Has
the Burmese Government received support from abroad; what has
been the general response from the international community?
Building on this discussion, Chapter VIII will speculate
on Burma's future. Considering the State Law and Order
Restoration Council's (SLORC) lack of concern for human
rights, their total disregard of the outcome from the
democratic elections held in 1990, and their singular ambition
of retaining power for the foreseeable future, what is the
outlook for Burma? How much longer can the SLORC hang on?
How much more can the people take? What will be the catalyst
for another popular revolt? Or, will the military become
strong enough to overcome, by force or reform, all of the
obstacles and opposition it faces in Burma today?
Finally, the last chapter examines past U.S. counter-
narcotics policy indicating its short-comings, and its
potential as a foundation on which to build a successful
future program. What can the U.S. do in the future which will
avoid the same impediments as our past program. Should the
U.S. counter-narcotics program work hand-in-hand with the
SLORC's efforts to control narcotics production? Or, in
light of their repression and brutality, should the U.S. take
steps to "help changes take place" in this unstable
environment? If the U.S. is to help these changes, what steps
should Washington take, and how far should the U.S. go? What
8
are the possible repercussions of these actions for Burma, and
for the region? Finally, what steps are being taken by the
world community as a whole? Are those steps in concert with
our own policy towards Burma?
II. HISTORY: A BASIS FOR CHAOS
This chapter will give a brief summary of Burma's
turbulent past, to help the reader visualize the historical
malice between the ethnic minorities and the Burman majority.
The colonial past points to contradicting loyalties, which has
been the foundation of many current misunderstandings and
conflicts. Upon gaining independence, Burma faced new
problems, which were dealt with, initially with honor and
fairness, later, with treachery and deceit—again to form the
basis for unrest and civil war. Each page of Burma's past
adds to the list of transgressions which have led to today's
unstable situation.
The culture of the Burmans, who entered central Burma
before the ninth century, contains elements of the ancient Pyu
civilization they absorbed and the sophisticated Buddhist
culture of the Mon kingdom they conquered. Burman kings ruled
for approximately one thousand years, a period marked by
cycles of power-dispersal and consolidation under various "min
laung", or charismatic savior-kings, who built royal temples
and forged symbolic links with heroes of the past dynasties to
legitimize their rule. The Burman monarch did not even
attempt to provide the country's highly autonomous minority
groups with direct leadership. These groups—which ranged
from the Shans in the eastern hills, with their Buddhist
10
culture and system of tribal chieftains, to the animistic
Karens, to the head-hunting Naga tribesmen along India's
border--lived for the most part outside a horseshoe-shaped
range of mountains that encircles the plains of central Burma,
where the Burmans settled. This natural buffer enabled the
ethnic groups to continue their traditional ways while
acknowledging Burman suzerainty."
Britain's abolition of the Burmese monarchy in 1885
exacerbated latent tensions between the Burmans and the
minority groups, which increased with the advent of Burman-led
nationalism. The Christian colonials also dispatched the
Buddhist hierarchy, encouraging Burman nationals to equate
Buddhism--and, later, socialist ideas--with nationalism, and
Christianity with colonialism and capitalism. Since the
1930 's Buddhism, socialism and nationalism have been
intertwined, with Marxist concepts easily translated into
Buddhist terms.''
Anti-colonial sentiments began to spread through Burma in
the mid-1930 's, and foreign military aid was sought by a few
nationalists. The assistance was found in Japan, which was
preparing for the coming war in the Pacific. A group of
thirty Burmese arrived in Japan to begin military training and
indoctrination. When the Japanese invaded Burma in 1942 the
Maureen Aung-Thwin, "Burmese Days", Foreign Affairs
Spring 1989) , 145-146.
6 IBID. , 146.
11
"Thirty Comrades" were included in the 'liberation' of their
country. Loyalties were slit along ethnic lines, as the
Burman population sided with the Axis, while most of the
ethnic minorities remained loyal to the British and the Allied
forces
.
Soon, however, the Burmese became disillusioned with
Japanese-style independence; the Thirty Comrades split into
two camps. One group, led by Aung San, contacted the Allies,
and in March 1945, turned against the Japanese. The other
group remained loyal to the Axis, and only joined with the
Allies when it was clear the Japanese were defeated.
In 1947, following the bitter colonial experience and the
devastation of World War 11, Aung San, the charismatic young
Burman independence leader emerged from the war as the
country's de facto leader; he is considered by most as the
father of modern Burma. Aung San was able to convince all but
one of the major ethnic groups--the Karen--to sign the
historic Panglong Agreement, by which they promised to join a
union with the majority Burmans. 7
The new nation, however, was instantly christened in
chaos that almost shattered it. A series of traumas that
befell Burma between 1947 and into 1949 continue to haunt the
nation: the assassination in 1947 of Aung San, who was
expected to be Burma's first head of state; the launching of
7 IBID.
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Southeast Asia's longest running Marxist insurgency by the
Burmese communists, who had been political mentors of Burma's
pre-independence nationalist movement; and the beginning of
armed rebellions by factions of Karen and Mon ethnic groups,
who lacked faith in the autonomy guaranteed in Burma's first
constitution of 1947. 8
Burma remained a parliamentary democracy for a decade,
and though the first constitution was written to allow some
groups to consider secession after a period of ten years,
communist and ethnic insurgencies--insurgencies will be
discussed later in this thesis--cont inually threatened
national unity. In 1948, the governing party was the Anti-
Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) --which led a revolt in
the closing days of WWII and helped Burma gain its
independence. Although it held an overwhelming majority of
seats in the legislator, the AFPFL was faced with serious
rivals, both in and outside of Burma. Factionalism within
the governing Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL)
forced Prime Minister U Nu to resign in 1958 in favor of a
caretaker regime headed by General Ne Win, Aung San's former
military subordinate and commander in chief of the armed
forces. Although U Nu was reelected to the prime minister's
office in 1960, political division soon recurred. U Nu
pledged that his government would restore public confidence in
a IBID. , 147
.
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democratic processes and foster racial harmony. Internal
troubles within his party, together with increased demands by
the Shans and the Kachins for greater autonomy and the looming
right of secession, prevented the government from
accomplishing these goals.
Prime Minister U Nu invited leaders of the minority
groups to help work out a solution to the country's political
instability. Before the meeting could get under way, Ne Win,
assuming the symbolic role of one of Burma's savior-kings,
ended civilian government, under the pretext that the
impending federal conference on secession might break up the
union.' All members of the government were arrested along
with key leaders of minority groups. The Constitution was set
aside and a self-appointed Revolutionary Council began to rule
by decree. 10
" David I. Steinburg, Burma's Road to Development: Growth
and Ideology Under Military Rule (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1981) 110.
Josef Silverstein, "From a Political to an
Administrative State, 1948-1988: Whatever Happened to
Democracy?", Independent Burma at Forty Years: Six Assessments
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University
Press, 1989) 14.
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Ill . THE BURMESE WAY
A. BLUEPRINT FOR DEVELOPMENT
The coup and the subsequent publication of the new
government's economic policy document, "The Burmese Way to
Socialism", signified a turning-point in Burma's post-WWII
economic growth. The Burmese Way to Socialism outlined the
military Government's commitment to the establishment of a
'socialist democratic state'. This was to be the blueprint
for action to restructure the economy and political
institutions in line with "socialism". The four principal
objectives of the Government's economic policy were: (1) the
elimination of foreign control of the economy; (2) a reduction
in the country's dependence on foreign markets; (3) a
restructuring of the economy away from its dependence on
primary production towards a more balanced industrial
condition; and, finally, (4) the centralization of economic
power in the hands of the state, in order to reduce the power
of the private market. 11 These objectives were to be
realized through the nationalization of all vital means of
production, including those in agriculture, industry,
commerce, transportation, communications, and external trade.
Ownership of the means of production was to be vested either
Shwe Lu Maung, Burma: Nationalism and Ideology (Dhaka:
Dhaka University Press, 1998) 53-55.
15
in the state, or in cooperatives or unions. While the
important role of agriculture in the economy was recognized,
priority was given to the development of industry and the
improvement of social services.
The military government's ideology, defined as the
"Burmese Way to Socialism", induced economic decline and saw
the country retreat into a state of self-imposed isolation.
Ne Win's party published its vague philosophy under the title
of "Correlation of Man and His Environment". The concept is




Although the party philosophy did not emphasize class
struggle, its ultimate goal was an exploitation-free society.
It said, "When all forms of suffering have been eliminated,
society will be free of all earthly suffering, such as
suffering due to poor living conditions, or lack of food and
inability to practice the Precepts." 13 However profound, the
philosophy failed to give and explain the ways and means by
which the idealized exploitation-free society would be
achieved. As he declared in his after-coup-- "victory " --
speech, General Ne Win was committed to lead Burma into
socialism, which was the desire of General Aung San.
12 IBID. , 53-54.
13 IBID.
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B. ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN THE 60 'S
In 1962 the Government abolished private trade in paddy
rice, and extended government control over the procurement and
export of other major agricultural exports. The new
Government, while reinforcing its claim to ownership of
agricultural land that had been nationalized in 1948, also
endeavored to eliminate landlordism and private agricultural
debt by introducing the 'Peasants Rights Protection Law' and
the 'Land Tenancy Act' in 1963. 14 This was followed by the
gradual nationalization of all wholesale and retail trade, a
restriction on the sale of essential commodities to new
'Peoples Shops', and the nationalization of all banks. In
all, some 15,000 private firms involved in the manufacturing
and trade sectors were acquired. 15
Initially, these reforms produced some benefits,
especially to the rural population. The elimination of debt
resulted in a more equitable distribution of income, while
access to basic social services, including health and
education, improved significantly. However, the emphasis on
industry and the provision of social services resulted in the
neglect of the country's three major productive sectors,






term economic growth and to the raising of living standards
for the bulk of the population.
In 1963 he formed the Burmese Socialist Programme Party
(BSPP) which would be the vanguard of his ideology. He
started with a nucleus of hard-core cadres, forming the basic
foundation of his loyal support, which was, and still is, the
army
.
Ne Win and his party undertook a series of socialistic
measures. His aim to establish self-sufficiency and autarky
in every sphere of economy and politics was appreciated and
applauded by the people, but every attempt at development
failed. In the attempt to remain independent of foreign
exploitation, Ne Win's Burma became totally xenophobic and
isolated--partly this is a result of very strong anti-colonial
sentiment which developed under British rule. The
government usurped the freedom of private enterprise by
totally nationalizing trade, industry, resource development
and banking, creating a giant superstructure of twenty-two
inefficient and mismanaged state corporations and enterprises.
By 1985 Burma had become one of the ten poorest nations in the
world. 17
Josef Silverstein, "1948 and Burma's Myth of
Independence", Independent Burma at Forty Years (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1989) 27.
17 Mya Maung, IBID., 604.
As the national economy plunged, the day-to-day life of
the people became a struggle. Under the 'Burmese Way to
Socialism' , the trading and economic institutions were
reorganized into 22 People's Corporations, which were also
called State Economic Enterprises (SEE). Practically all
Cabinet posts and heads of the SEEs were filled by military
personnel who had Ne Win's confidence. This was
understandable from a political perspective because the
practice had always been widespread--U Nu also had appointed
those he could trust to important positions of power. While at
least some of U Nu ' s appointees had administrative experience
in running the country, Ne Win's military appointees had
little, or no experience. Some of the military personnel
learned their jobs, but as soon as they were trained they were
either moved to a new position or removed for political
reasons. Important civilian posts were used as a reward for
deserving military personnel. Many of the military personnel
in these positions felt they could ignore the advice of
technocrats or civilian experts and often made decisions based
on what they saw as "socialist principles" instead of
pragmatism.
Soon after the creation of the SEEs, an additional one--
People's Corporation 23--emerged under the supervision of the
private entrepreneurs--the Black Market. The black market has
served Burma so well the military and government officials
used it to supplement their own incomes. Special military
19
stores allow military personnel to buy scarce imported goods
at low, government-subsidized prices, based on the official
exchange rate--approximately 6.2 kyat to the dollar--and then
resell the goods on the black market at a hefty profit--the
black market exchange rate has recently been as high as 75-80
kyat to the dollar. 18
The Government also failed to build upon the foundations
of its agrarian reform program. A policy that kept
procurement prices for paddy low resulted in unfavorable terms
of trade for agricultural products. The policy was regarded
as a means of keeping down costs down and prices stable, as
well as an incentive to industrial growth. It was also
regarded as a means by which the Government could raise
revenue, since the profits from the sale of rice on export
markets were a primary source of government revenue at this
time. Yet with agricultural production effectively in private
hands, this policy undermined efforts to increase production
as well as the Government's own procurement efforts.
Disruptions in marketing also followed the
nationalization of the paddy trade. During the first decade
of military rule, both the hectarage under paddy and paddy
yields grew slowly. As a result, the growth in production
failed to keep pace with the growth of the population. With
10 David Steinburg, "Democracy, Power, and the Economy in
Myanmar" , Asian Survey , VOL. XXXI, NO. 8 (August 1991) 73 8 /The
official exchange rate is also listed in several publications,
including The Far Eastern Economic Review.
20
the Government giving priority to ensuring an adequate food
supply at home, exports inevitably suffered. Rice exports,
which totalled some 1.84m. tons in 1961-1962, declined to only
0.65m. tons in 1970-1971. : " The production and export of
other primary products, which, together with rice, accounted
for over 80% of export earnings in 1970, also declined
dramatically in subsequent years, producing a severe shortage
of foreign exchange. 20
The industrial sector similarly failed to perform well,
although it was given priority in terms of resource
allocation. While the industrial sector received increasing
share of total public investment throughout this period. The
Government continued to invest in new plant, despite the
inefficient utilization of existing plant. ~- Industrial
output also suffered from serious administrative problems,
caused by the lack of expertise within the public sector.
Growth in the state sector was insufficient to compensate for
the decline in the private sector; shortages developed and
rationing became routine. In fact, the only sector of the







Burma's GDP per capita increased by only 2.7% during the
first decade of military rule. The improvement of social
services and the reduction of foreign influence and control
over the economy were the major policy achievements of this
period. 2 ' Nonetheless, poverty remained widespread.
Although some objectives of the political agenda and
social program were achieved, for the most part the policy
failed; the economy remained stagnant during the next decade.
While overall paddy (rice) production increased, the per
capita paddy production decreased. This resulted in rice
riots and escalating consumer prices in 1967. During this
period, political opposition mounted while the economy
adjusted by producing a huge black market. Government
investment was insufficient to replace foreign contribution
and declining private investment. This forced the government
to change some of its policies, practices, and institutional
structures; the next economic plan was introduced--a new
twenty-year development plan was adopted by the BSPP.
C. MULTI-YEAR ECONOMIC PLANNING
In 1972, when the BSPP outlined their major economic
reforms, they had in mind a frame work of a 20-year plan.
The new plan shifted the emphasis to the agricultural sector,
giving it priority over the industrial sector, and recognized
IBID
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the role of the private sector in economic development. It
also acknowledged the need for foreign assistance and
developmental aid. A bonus system was introduced in the State
Economic Enterprises (SEE), and incentives were given to
farmers in the form of inputs to stimulate individual efforts
to improve efficiency and productivity.
This represented the country's first real attempt at
long-range planning, and provided only broad guidelines with
respect to goals and priorities: it was to be divided up into
five four-year plans. The first of these, carried over from
the period before the announcement of the policy reforms, was
cut short in March of 1974, to make room for the next four-
year plan. Economic performance improved as the new policies
began to take effect. This was especially true under the
third plan (1978-1982), when GDP increased by 6.6% per
year.-" Much of the success of the third plan was
attributable to the rapid growth of the agricultural sector as
a result of the introduction of some high-yield varieties, and
favorable weather. Paddy production increased by 65% under
the third plan, while the agricultural sector as a whole grew
at an annual rate of 8.6%. 24 However, as the world prices
for rice began to fall around 1983, the economy, dependent
IBID.
24 Rodney Tasker, "Creaking to a Halt: A Mismanaged
Economy has to Depend on Foreign Dole", Far Eastern Economic
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primarily on paddy, began to deteriorate—despite its vast,
untapped resources and undeveloped agricultural potential--
ultimately collapsing in the mid-1980s.
The GDP growth rate under the fourth plan (1982-1986) was
5.5% per year, falling short of the target of 6.2%.~ r The
performance .of the agricultural sector, which contributed
almost 30% of GDP in 1986, was a major factor influencing the
outcome of the fourth plan, since the sector grew at only 4.7%
during the plan period.-' However, growth was also affected
by a widening trade deficit, resulting from lower export
earnings, and by a significant increase in debt-service
repayments, which caused a severe shortage of foreign
exchange. Declining exports and rising imports forced the
government to borrow from external sources; foreign debt rose
from US$1 billion in 1979 to more than US$4 billion in
1988/89.
Measures were introduced to cut imports and to reduce
the public-sector deficit. Public-sector investment, which
accounts for some 80% of total investment, declined during
each of the four years of the plan. 27 To alleviate this
problem, in 1986 the government applied to the United Nations
for "Least Developed Country" (LDC) status, which was granted
IBID.
26 IBID.
27 David Steinburg, Burma's Road to Development
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in December 1987. This move by the government was designed to
secure more foreign aid and to reschedule the country's
external debt repayments.
The draft of the fifth plan (1986/87-1989/90), was based
on an aggressive target growth rate of 6.1%. J< This was
higher than the rate achieved under the fourth plan, and given
the poor prospects of the external economy, the target was
later revised downwards to a more realistic 4.5%. As the
country's economic problems intensified, even this lower
target was not achieved. As originally drafted, the fifth
plan continued to stress economic self-sufficiency, but also
allowed for some increased foreign participation where it was
considered 'mutually benefitial'.
The government initiated a program of economic reforms,
similar to those agreed to by the BSPP, which represented the
effective abandonment of the precepts of the "Burmese Way to
Socialism" . In October 1988 the state monopoly on internal
and external trade was removed from all goods except teak,
petroleum, natural gas, pearls, and gems--the most lucrative
and profitable commodities. This was followed by the
publication, in November, of a seemingly very liberal foreign
investment law; prior to which, foreign investment had not
been allowed. The economic reforms of 1988 represent the
complete abandonment of the policy of self-sufficiency and
IBID.
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adoption of a completely 'open-door policy' on foreign
investment, which is now seen as crucial for economic recovery
and development
.
Under the Foreign Investment Law published in 1988, 100%
foreign-owned companies were allowed in certain sectors, in
addition to joint ventures where foreign capital had to form
at least 35% of the total capital. The Law also offered
exemption from tax for at least three years and a range of
other incentives, as well as guarantees against
nationalization. In seeking foreign investment, priority was
to be given to the promotion and expansion of exports, the
exploitation of natural resources requiring large investment,
the acquisition of advanced technology, employment generation,
energy conservation and development. By 1990 the Government
had some success in attracting foreign investment,
particularly into the energy sector. However, Burma's ability
to absorb a major inflow of foreign investment was limited in
the short term, most notably by its poor infrastructure,
inefficient banking sector and shortages of skilled labor.
Throughout the years, the often extreme government
actions—declaring legal tender worthless without
compensation, banning certain occupations, and prohibiting
private trade in rice (the country's main commodity) --
frequently disrupted economic and social life. Gradually,
smuggling came to account for most of the economic activity in
26
the country.-'" While private-sector initiative was stifled,
the military-dominated state system became progressively less
productive. Promotion within the bureaucracy has been based
on political loyalty rather than ability, the civil service
became increasingly incompetent. 30
Burma is now faced with the difficult transition towards
a more open economy. While the potential impact of the
current reforms in the medium and long-term is likely to be
significant, the short-term impact will be limited by the slow
pace of political reforms. Apart from encouraging the
resumption of Western aid, political reforms will also be
necessary to ensure the confidence of domestic entrepreneurs.
With an estimated per capita income of below U.S. $200, Burma
is one of the poorest countries in the world. 31
29 Helen E. White, "Piecemeal Burma Reforms Fail to Revive







The country was renamed the Socialist Republic of the
Union of Burma, on 3 January 1974, after a new constitution
had been proclaimed. U Ne Win resigned as president in 1981,
but remained chairman of the BSPP. The government suppressed
the peoples' freedom to express, dissent, and gather against
the state by abolishing all political parties and instituted
a single party system-- "for greater internal stability".
Political power was nominally vested in the Central
Committee whose members were not selected according to their
abilities or by the will of the people, but according to their
loyalty and absolute submission to the whims of the dictator.
For instance, at the Third Party Congress of the BSPP in 1977,
Ne Win came in third in the elections for the presidency. The
results were not honored; he quickly installed himself as
president and dissolved the entire Central Committee. 3 -
Ne Win has succeeded in sustaining his dictatorship for
over a quarter-century by annihilating all potential
contenders to his political throne--real or imagined. The
loyalty he has been able to muster has been achieved by a
combination of "carrot and stick". Four factors have been
Mya Maung, IBID, 606
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crucial for the durability of the army rule in Burma; (1) they
are ruthless in dealing with the civilian opposition; (2) they
control an omnipresent and highly effective intelligence
apparatus; (3) promotion is based on loyalty rather than
competence; and, (4) an abundance of privileges are provided
to those who remain loyal. i -
B. DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT/CRACKDOWN
Deteriorating economic conditions helped prompt
nationwide demonstrations in 1988 calling for a democratic
government and an end to Ne Win's dictatorial rule. Ne Win
resigned from all official posts in the summer of that year,
amid growing pressure from the people for him to step down.
General Saw Maung, the head of the ruling military
committee and the new Prime Minister, brutally cleared the
streets of protesters. His lackluster team of Ne Win
loyalists was determined not to flee Burma or to allow his
reputation and political legacy to meet defeat. Officially in
retirement since he "stepped down" in mid- July, Ne Win
nevertheless was the final arbiter for the close-knit circle
of loyalists in the cabinet and the BSPP charged with the day-
to-day management of the crisis. When efforts to appease
protesters failed, Ne Win turned to his Armed Forces Chief of
Staff, Saw Maung, to usher in a "new order".
Bertil Lintner, "Class Distinctions", Far Eastern
Economic Reviev (6 December 1990) 28.
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The takeover was designed to create the impression of a
break with the discredited socialist old regime. Government
bodies and laws favoring the BSPP were abolished, the
country's pre-1974 name, "Union of Burma" was restored, and
the military, en masse, resigned from the party--as directed
by General Saw Maung . The military rule, however, was merely
a screen behind which Ne Win and his inner circle would
continue to direct events.
After the junta seized power in September 1988, it lost
control of the situation killing thousands of unarmed
protestors. Stating that he believed he had saved the country
from chaos, General Saw Maung moved quickly to distance the
"new" government from Ne Win's BSPP, and formed the State Lav;
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) --the same ruling body
under a different name.
The survival of the military regime in Burma is one of
the surprises of current politics in Southeast Asia,
especially after the massive popular protests that swept the
country from March to September 1988. Hopes had risen that
General Ne Win--still pulling the strings of power from behind
the scenes—and his obstinate successors might bow out to an
elected civilian government.
Tensions continued to mount between the SLORC and
opposition groups; the SLORC established military tribunals
to try persons violating its martial lav; regulations--such as
failing to observe curfew or participating in gatherings of
30
more than four people. The minimum sentence that the
tribunals could impose was three years' imprisonment, and the
maximum was the death penalty. After the passing of the death
sentence, all that was required before execution was the
approval of the local military commander. It is estimated
that at the end of 1990 over 400 active members of the
National League for Democracy (NLD) were under detent ion- -an
unknown number had been executed.
To appease the mass discontent, the SLORC promised to
hold "free and fair" elections for a new parliament, which
would draft a new constitution. No date was initially given
for the elections, and many opposition leaders viewed the
announcement as a ploy to quell the unrest
.
Despite the illusions of the SLORC, one by one,
opposition political leaders who had become prominent
following the countrywide, anti-government demonstrations
disappeared from public life. The SLORC had detained the two
main opposition leaders Tin U and Aung San Suu Kyi--
respectively chairman and general secretary of the NLD--in
July of 1989. On 29 December the SLORC placed another
outspoken critic of the regime, former prime minister U Nu--
and twelve of his associates--under house arrest. On 16
January 1990, Aung San Suu Kyi, still under house arrest, was
barred from standing in the elections on the grounds of her
34 Bertil Lintner, "The Election Charade", Far Eastern
Economic Review (18 January 1990) 15.
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alleged links with "insurgent groups " --seen as a reference to
dissident student fugitives based along the Thai border. 35
The elections were indeed held on 27 May 1990, and
appeared to reflect the SLORC's belief that its year-long
campaign against the opposition NLD had been effective. If
so, it represented an extraordinary underestimation of the
degree of animosity which still existed toward the military by
the people. The astonishing degree of openness permitted by
the SLORC during the pre-election campaign period, vividly
contrasting with the previous months of repression, severely
restricted campaigning and harassment of candidates and
political activists, indicated the extent of the military's
delusions
.
Whether despite or because of these measures, more than
70% of the electorate went to the polls on election day. The
outcome was an astonishing victory for the NLD, which captured
392 of the 485 seats contested in the election. The rest of
the seats went to NLD allies from various minority areas, save
10 seats, which went to the military-backed National Unity
Party (NUP) an offshoot of the BSPP. 36
The SLORC appeared utterly unprepared for an NLD victory.
After waiting about a month the SLORC struck back, stating the
election was not to elect a new parliament, but to elect a
ij IBID.
Rodney Tasker, "Military Manoeuvres", Far Eastern
Economic Review (12 July 1990) 10-11.
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"constituent assembly" . The assembly would have only the power
vested to draft a new constitution, which had to be ratified
by the SLORC upon completion. 3 According to Khin Nyunt,
Directorate of the Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI),"A
political party does not automatically have the three
sovereign powers of the legislative, administrative, and
judicial powers by the emergence of a Pyithu Hluttav;
[parliament] . Only the SLORC has the right to legislative
power. Drafting an interim constitution to obtain state power
and to form a government will not be accepted. Effective
action will be taken by the SLORC, according to the lav;."
Khin Nyunt it believed by many to brandish the real power in
the country. 38
Growing frustrations with the military's refusal to honor
the outcome of the election finally led to renewed street
demonstrations and violence. The SLORC seized the opportunity
and accused the NLD of instigating unrest. Using this as a
pretext, the SLORC acted to crush all remaining opposition to
its rule. Taking advantage of the distraction provided by the
events in the Persian Gulf War, the SLORC arrested most of the
few remaining opposition figures, banned some political





parties, and mixed repression with vague promises of a
possible liberalization in the future. 39
An editorial in the government-controlled "Working
Peoples Daily" on 8 February 1991 made the surprising promise
that the SLORC would relinquish power after approving a new
constitution drawn up by political and other representatives.
But the newspaper failed to indicate how, or to whom, the
transfer would be made. 40 In the meantime, the government
continues to harass potential opponents while bribing others
to toe the line.
Army hard-liners have further consolidated their grip on
power, despite the general elections in May 1990, by ruling
out a transition to civilian rule and closing the door to
negotiations with the opposition. Even the prospect of an
unofficial power-sharing agreement, between military and
civilian elites faded by the end of 1990. Throughout 1991 the
SLORC continued to rule Burma with a "firm" hand.
' Bertil Lintner, "Bans and Bribes", Far Eastern Economic





The civil war in Burma has raged for almost 44 years.
Burma, in effect, is a divided country where rebels have held
much of the countryside and government troops were more or
less confined to major towns and the roads running between
them.
The major threat came from the communists, who went into
revolt three months after independence. The People's
Volunteer Organization (PVO), a mainstay in the AFPFL, split
and a majority followed the communists. In 1949 the Karen
National Defence Organization (KNDO) rebelled. Despite the
preponderance of opposition, the government did not collapse,
mainly because the rebels fought each other as well as
government forces. The leadership of U Nu united the people
in support of the government, and by 1951 the armed forces had
regained control of much of the countryside 41 --this was due
more to a lack of regional support for the rebel groups, than
a military superiority of the government forces.
With a restless population and some 20 insurgency
movements throughout the border regions, the military has been
hard-pressed to devote the few resources it has to fighting a
41 John F. Cady, The United States And Burma (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1976) 190-196.
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drug war. Instead, it has focused its assets on eliminating
the most troublesome insurgencies. For most of the past four
decades, in fact, Rangoon has been trying to gain control of
the northern and eastern provinces where the opium trade
flourishes. However, because the insurgencies have been
strong enough in the past to force a stalemate throughout much
of the hill country, government forces control only the most
easily accessible real estate.
Many of Burma's insurgencies are based on centuries of
animosity between ethnic Burmese and the various minority
groups, which make up about 1/3 of the country's total
population. Relations between Burmans and minorities worsened
after Burma became independent in 1948 and the Burman-
dominated central government attempted to increase control
over traditionally autonomous minority areas. The minority
populations responded with a heightened sense of a separate
and distinct identity and a desire for political independence.
This, in turn, led to military confrontations between the
Burmese Army and the more than 20 insurgent groups organized
within the ethnic populations. 42
Britain's colonial practice of "divide and rule" kept the
ethnic populations serarate from the majority Burman
population. The British arrangements reflected the
traditional administrative structure of the old Burmese
4J Bertil Lintner, "An Insurgency Who's Who", Far Eastern
Economic Reviev (28 May 1987), 48-49.
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kingdoms. The minority areas had always been subject to the
Burmese court. However, they remained largely independent,
retaining their traditional rulers, languages, and cultures so
long as they recognized the formal suzerainty of Burma's kings
and paid tribute to them.
Before Burma could become an independent nation, its
leaders had to unify the various administrative areas into a
single functioning political entity; two approaches were taken
by the nationalists. The first was that taken by Aung San, in
which he offered the minorities a certain degree of autonomy
in return for joining the Burmans in a political union and
giving their loyalty to a central authority in Rangoon. This
plan was widely accepted and probably would have succeeded,
had Aung San not been assassinated in 1947.
The second approach has been championed by Ne Win, and
several other top military leaders, which denied the existence
of separate ethnic, cultural, and territorial divisions among
the diverse peoples of Burma. They claimed this had simply
been a ploy used by the British to divide the country. Along
these lines, Ne Win and his supporters felt that autonomy for
any minority group, however large, was a threat to national
unity. Throughout Ne Win's 2 9 years of rule, the government's
approach to the ethnic insurgency has been to try to suppress
it by force of arms.
In 1947, the Shan State joined with Burma in order to
receive independence from the British under the Panglong
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Agreement. That agreement provided for the complete
independence of Shan State in ten years (1957) --an event which
did not take place. Comprising almost 40% of the Burma land
mass, the region generates 80% of the nation's GNP. 43 Most
other minority groups also signed the agreement, but later
broke off relations as conditions v/orsened.
Ethnic groups like the Karen, the Kachin, the Arakanese,
the Shan, and many others have long insisted on regional
autonomy, or even independence, instead of living under Ne
Win's rule. Most of them maintain their own armies, some of
which number in the thousands of troops; the total number of
armed insurgents is estimated at well over 25,000. Heavily
armed and fiercely independent, often under the leadership of
a charismatic warlord, groups such as the Kachin National Army
(KNA) , the Pa-o National Liberation Army (PNLA), the Wa
National Army (WNA) , the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
and dozens of others have in the past roamed the jungles with
little fear of interference by government forces. While they
all claim they are fighting for independence, later discussion
will show that many are simply narcotics trafficking
organizations
.
The two largest ethnic insurgent groups are the Karen
National Union and the Kachin Independence Organization. The
Karen began their struggle in 1949. The Mons and the Karennis
David Steinburg, Burma's Road to Development , 140-155
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went into rebellion at about the same time. The Communist
Party of Burma (CPB) also took up arms against the government
shortly after independence- -except for a brief alliance with
Rangoon against the Karen in the late 1940 's. The Shan
followed in 1958. The Kachin, however, tried to work out
their differences peacefully, without arms; but after years of
frustrating negotiations, which accomplished little, they too
went into revolt
.
While the Shan are one of the largest ethnic populations,
their resistance effort remains divided among many smaller
competing factions. Furthermore, from 1958 onwards , Karen and
Kachin troops fighting the Rangoon government, though
originally joining the Shan in rebellion, soon retreated to
and came to dominate the Shan territory. This forced the Shan
people to flee deeper into the jungles and mountains of the
interior of Shan state.
Involvement of CIA affiliated groups in the narcotics
trade began to escalate rapidly in the 1960 's when the opium
production of Laotian and Shan peasants was greatly increased
with the assistance of the CIA. Transportation for the
processed opium and heroin was allegedly provided by Air
America--which, in the 1970 's was exposed as a CIA front
organization. Profits from the operations are thought to have
been used to finance recruitment and training of mercenary
armies, covert operations, and for support of operations
carried out against China. In the secret war in Laos, and the
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Vietnam conflict Air America was again used for the same
purposes, which filtered over into Burma. 44
In 1976, ten insurgent groups, including the Karen and
the Kachin, formed a loose coalition known as the National
Democratic Front to better coordinate action against the
central government. Initial demands, calling for independent
countries, were set aside, and the coalition now seeks a
federated, democratic Burma, with special protection for
minority rights. 4 "' In 1987, the minorities gave up their
demands for separation in favor of a return to a modified
version of the old federal constitution.
Funding for these regional armies comes from a variety of
sources; however, the primary source by far is from smuggling.
If not directly involved in smuggling drugs, a group will tax
all goods transiting their domain. Teak, rice, gold, rubies,
jade, antiquities, and tungsten are all sneaked over the
border into Thailand, China, and India to trade for weapons,
hard-to-get consumer goods, or hard currency. The biggest
money-maker of them all is heroin.
44 Testimony of Lt . Col. James "Bo" Gritz, U.S. Army,
(Ret.), U.S. Narcotics Control Efforts In Southeast Asia
,
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th
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D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 3-9.
Bertil Lintner, "War in the North: Communist and
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A better comprehension of the insurgents' motives would
be beneficial in understanding the ongoing civil war and its
complexities. The Karen will be examined first; theirs is the
longest running revolt as well as the most violent. The next
group discussed will be the Kachin; they are the most
organized and best equipped. Other groups that will be
discussed include the Shan and the Nagas--the discussion will
be limited to a few of the better known ethnic insurgencies.
The largest non-ethnic, ideologically-based insurgency in
Burma had been the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) . While the
CPB was heavily involved in trafficking, it is more suitable
to discuss the movement as an insurgency because its primary
focus was anti-government and turned to trafficking much later
in their brief history-
Other major influences in the decades-long civil war were
the Kuomindong (KMT) and other trafficking organizations
opposed to Burma's central government. Although central to
the conflict, they will be addressed more appropriately in the
chapter dealing directly with the opium trade.
B. THE KAREN
The Karen, are thought to have originated in the Gobi
Desert, and migrated to Burma around the 8th century B.C.,
occupying its central region. Successive waves of Mon and,
eventually, Burman invaders pushed the Karen into the delta
region and the mountains in the southeast region of Burma.
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There they remained, subject to Burmese domination until the
British arrived in the 19th century.
The British found the Karen to be intensely loyal and
fierce fighters, and enlisted their support to maintain order
throughout the Burmese province--during the pre-independence
era. A Burman revolt against the British in the 1930 's was put
down by Karen troops, which caused additional friction between
the two groups that have yet to come to terms
.
During WWII, the Karen loyally served with British
guerrilla forces in Burma, fighting against the Japanese and
the anti-colonial Burmese forces. However, in their haste to
decolonize after the war, the British forgot their promises of
autonomy made to the Karen, focusing instead on passing
control of the country to the ethnic Burman majority.
The Karen, still armed from the war, began a military
campaign for autonomy in 1949. In a short period the Karen
had pushed to the outskirts of Rangoon, laying siege to the
capital. Desperate, the government forged a brief alliance
with the CPB, whose guerrilla forces cut the Karen supply
lines to the east of Rangoon. This forced the Karen to
withdraw. During the following decade, the Karen forces
withdrew into the mountains along the eastern border with
Thailand. Pressure remained constant, yet tolerable after
this, despite Ne Win's coup in 1962 and the subsequent




In 1985, however, the Burmese stepped up its operation
against the KNLA, advancing deep into Karen territory,
securing many border trading centers and gaining access to
vast resources. By 1991, this advance had deprived the Karen
of badly needed income from their lucrative cross-border trade
with Thailand. The Karen, until recently, have been a self-
supporting society unto themselves; harvesting their own
natural resources--teak, antimony, lead, and tungsten comprise
the bulk of their exports--for export to Thailand. The KNU--
the political arm of the KNLA--is fiercely opposed to
narcotics use or trafficking. They have never had to resort
to the opium trade as a source of income; its use or any
involvement in trafficking narcotics by any members of its
organization, carries a stiff penalty of death. 46
In recent months the Karen have taken their fight to the
delta region; southwest of Rangoon. The move was seen by
military analysts as a diversion for the latest government
assault on their headquarters in Manerplaw. The move may have
more long-term strategic merit besides reducing short-term
pressures. When the military crushed the pro-democracy
movement in 1988 many students and other anti-SLORC groups
sought refuge along the Thai border, and, surprisingly, among
the Karen--it was startling, because the Karen had been
Interview with Mr. Dale Scoggin, April 1991. Mr.
Scoggin spent eight weeks with the KNU, while on assignment as
photographer for a foreign journal, during August-September
1989.
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thought of as 'anti-Burmese'. Their presence in this
traditional rebel stronghold could, very well, spark another
popular uprising against the SLORC. 47 The SLORC realizes
this fact, and has refused to negotiate with the Karen to
bring about a peaceful settlement to the civil war. Instead




Located in the northern region of Burma, the Kachin were
also very loyal to the British leadership. They too fought
bravely with Allied forces against the Japanese during the
war. After the war, the Kachin, like the Karen, were
abandoned by the Allies to allow the Burmese rulers a chance
to unite the country.
The Kachin did not take up arms against the government
until 1961, although they did clash with the CPB prior to
that. In that year, the Burmese parliament decided to
establish buddhism as the official state religion of Burma--a
move seen by the predominantly Christian Baptist hill tribes
as an open provocation. The first stated purpose of the young
Kachin nationalists was to oppose this decision and what they
termed "Burman chauvinism" they believed it reflected.
47 Bertil Lintner, "Return to the Delta", Far Eastern
Economic Review (14 November 1991) 26.
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Around the same time, a second action took place which
complicated matters further. Burma reached an accord with
China to settle a border dispute. Burma turned over part of
Kachin territory and several villages to China, in exchange
for another piece of land near Namkham--not part of Kachin
territory. 48 The failure of the central government to
clarify the nature of the settlement, or to compensate the
Kachin has been at the crux of the dispute ever since, driving
many Kachin underground.
Following almost a decade of fighting, hostilities with
the CPB ceased in 1976 when Brang Seng became the chairman of
the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) , the political arm
of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) . For the Kachins, the
ceasefire with the CPB not only brought peace--at least on one
front--but also a badly needed infusion of Chinese weapons.
The KIA, as a result, was able to quickly expand their forces
to over 5,000 men. Rangoon, however, turned the alliance into
a political football, claiming the Kachin were now a communist
organization
.
Although the Kachin were at peace with the communists
they did not change their ideology. Eschewing communist
philosophy, they remained Christians, but were able to form a
military alliance with the CPB, against the central
government. Beijing saw an opportunity for revenge against
48 Bertil Lintner, Land of Jade (Hong Kong: White Lotus,
1990) 170.
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the Burmese government for their part in instigating anti-
Chinese riots in 1967--Ne Win tried to divert public anger
from a severe rice shortage caused primarily by poor
government planning and mismanagement --and was happy to
provide logistic support of the KIA.
Under Brang Seng's leadership, separatism was abandoned
in favor of regional autonomy instead. The KIO chairman
instead pushed for a system of autonomy at several levels of
government throughout Burma. This seems to be a well-planned,
viable solution to the myriad of ethnic grievances, and one
that has gained widespread approval among anti-government
organizations. He was instrumental in organizing the National
Democratic Front (NDF) , and has pursued more cooperation
between the ethnic insurgents and other ant i -government rebel
groups in dealing with the threat from the military.
The KIA has been able to fund its activities by smuggling
and taxing the lucrative jade trade that flourishes in their
territory. Although they do not condone its cultivation or
its use, the Kachin do impose a tax on opium transiting its
realm. Additional financial support is given by organizations
in Taiwan, South Korea, Europe, and the United States. 49
4Q IBID. , 141.
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D. THE SHAN
In 1961, when the Shan National Army (SNA) was formed, U
Ba Thein became its deputy commander. Unlike many of the
minority leaders in the Golden Triangle, U Ba Thein was not a
simple mercenary or drug lord. At the peak of his power in
the mid-1960 's, he was considered one of the most important
men of the Shan independence movement. Most of his activities
were designed to further the cause. 5 ' During the first
year, operations were hampered by a severe lack of funds and
arms. To alleviate the situation the SNA began to act as a
go-between, trading opium-collected by other rebel groups--for
modern weapons--f rom suppliers in Thailand and Laos. With
more weapons in their possession the Shan rebels were able to
exert more pressure to increase the quantity of opium
collected from the local villages. More opium meant more
weapons, which in turn meant more control and power. The
cycle of two way smuggling of opium and arms allowed the SNA
to push the Burmese out of the territory--except for a few
ma in cities.
While opium was the main ingredient for its rapid growth
and rise to power, it was also the catalyst for the demise of
SNA military effectiveness and eventual collapse. There was
enough opium in the region to provide enough arms and money to
' Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Brooklyn, N.Y.:
Lawrence Hill Books, 1991) 343-345.
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support several rebel armies and make their leaders very
wealthy. Rebel commanders became preoccupied with protecting
their territorial prerogatives and expanding their personal
fiefs. Instead of sending troops into an adjoining area to
launch a joint operation against the Burmese, a SNA commander
kept his men on patrol inside his own domain to collect opium
tax and keep others away. Adrian Cowell described the
organization as, "... a group of independent warlords loosely
tied into a weak federation with a president as a
figurehead."" 1 ; therefore dismissing its effectiveness as an
insurgent army because of the corruptive effect opium had upon
its leadership and men.
By 1966 the SNA had dissolved into several opium
trafficking groups; the largest of these became the Shan State
Army (SSA)
. Repeated taxation by roving Shan warlords
discouraged most forms of legitimate economic activity. Rather
than producing an independent, unified Shan land, the Shan
rebellion seemed to unleash an instability which allowed petty
warlords to rule the countryside and impoverish the people.
The most powerful warlord in the region until the late-1980's
was Khun Sa--Khun Sa will be discussed in more detail later in
this text
.
As Khun Sa ' s control over the drug trade expanded, his
opium adversaries collapsed. In 1986 Shan State Army remnants
IBID, 347-348.
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criticized Khun Sa for running an opium army, conniving with
the Burmese army, and assisting rebel leaders. Within months,
however, these Shan nationalist leaders had allied with the
CPB as their independent forces continued to decline in
52
With the collapse of the CPB and government pledges to
launch border development programs in the northern Shan state
the SSA also collapsed as thousands of insurgents rallied
behind the government forces. This action effectively ended
the Shan rebellion--except for a relatively small force of
several hundred soldiers."
E. COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA (CPB)
Shortly after independence, the CPB broke off relations
with Rangoon and entered into armed revolt. The Burmese army
eventually pushed them back into the northern regions of
Burma, where for the next two decades, they inflicted minor
damage on Rangoon
.
The CPB reestablished its bases on the Burma-China border
in the early 1970 's with Beijing's support and was rewarded
with liberal arms shipments and financial support. This
territory contained 80% of Burma's poppy growing region, but
52 Bertil Lintner, Far Eastern Economic Review (January
1, 1987) .
i Bertil Lintner, "Triangular Ties, Far Eastern Economic
Review (28 March 1991) 23.
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the party discouraged the cultivation of opium in order to
increase food crops
.
The CPB initiated a crop substitution program and
introduced several types of wheat and grain to the hill
tribes. These efforts in crop substitution, though well
intentioned, met with failure. Villagers had no idea how to
prepare the wheat--cooking it instead as they did rice--many
got sick. Additionally, a fluke of nature--the bamboo
blossomed, which attracted millions of rats overwhelming the
hill tribes by eating most of the wheat and spreading
diseases--resulted in massive famine. The CPB again came to
the rescue by paying the farmers for the lost revenue from
their ill-fated crops with Indian rupees and opium. 54 In the
late 1970's, however, the CPB leadership publicly criticized
China's leader Deng Xiaoping, opting instead to support Mao
Zedong. As Deng's influence increased in the ensuing years,
China's shipments of arms to the CPB correspondingly declined,
and Chinese 'volunteers' withdrew back to China.
With fewer arms to attract other rebel groups, the CPB
sought revenues from opium trafficking and taxation of the
black market trade between Burma and China. 5 - By 1980 the
CPB controlled the largest opium growing region in the Shan
states and had diversified into heroin refining. By 1982
54 IBID., 266
Lintner, Land of Jade, 261
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however, its military expansion was slowed by its inability to
procure arms
.
The CPB explained this shift to opium trading as a
response to economic pressures caused by withdrawal of support
by its former patron the Chinese Communist Party. Officially,
the CPB limited its involvement to collection of a 20% tax
from opium farmers. But in reality, the party dominated the
drug trade in its region by (1) collecting a 10% tax of local
opium sales and a 5% tax on any exports from its territory;
(2) transporting opium to the Thai-Burma border refineries
operated by Khun Sa and the KMT; (3) taxing Chinese syndicate
heroin refineries operating within its domain, and; (4)
failing to discipline any CPB local commanders active in the
trade. 56
In 1985 the CPB announced a death penalty for cadre
involved in heroin trading, a decision which was prompted by
the party's embarrassment at the scale of its drug dealing and
China's objections to the increasing amounts of heroin
transiting across its territory on its way to Hong Kong and
ports in the West . The attempted suppression produced severe
frictions between the party's aging leadership and the local
CPB commanders who were now opium warlords, thereby
56 IBID
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contributing to the collapse of the CPB which would later
occur in 1989 . 57
In 1987 the Burmese army assaulted and occupied the CPB's
main trading post on the Chinese border, eliminating half of
the CPB's annual revenues and destroying much of their
influence in the Shan state. 58 This caused great alarm among
the CPB leadership because they realized the extent of the
deterioration of their relationship with Beijing, and the loss
of the cross-border trade would put considerable strain on
their coffers. The financial drain and loss of support proved
too costly for the CPB.
F . NAGAS
China's long-standing hostility towards India, and the
unsettled border dispute between the two giants, prompted
Beijing to eschew ideology in the interests of realpolitik,
and send aid to the Nagas . By supporting the Nagas, the
Chinese hoped to destabilize India's sensitive northeastern
region and force it to pull troops away from the ceasefire
line in the Himalayas/-' the Naga insurgents were given
weapons and limited financial backing for their hopeless
Bertil Lintner, The Rise and Fall of the Communist
Party of Burma ( Ithaca : Southeast Asian Program, Cornell
University, 1990) 39-46.
58 IBID
Lintner, Land of Jade, IBID.
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cause. Beijing was well aware of the futile nature of the
rebellion, but the value of the instability caused by the
uprising to the Indian government was well worth the cost.
India also assisted the Naga insurgents, to some degree,
in response to the Chinese efforts, but primarily due to a
change in their own domestic policy which provided a subsidy
to the minority areas and helped to stabilize the region.
This new strategy has been expanded to other regions because
of its great success.' 1
Despite support from both China and India, the Naga
insurgency is among the poorest . They fight on in vain hoping
to form an independent Nagaland, formed from the Naga-
inhabited lands in both India and Burma. They would be better
off if they joined forces with the NDF, or the KIA, to fight
for regional autonomy instead of insisting on their present
goals
.
The Nagas themselves conquered their present domain
through brutal methods, severing the heads of their captured
enemies--the last head was taken less than a decade ago."
The practice was eventually stopped by Christian missionaries







A. THE HEROIN TRADE
America's heroin addicts are victims of the most
profitable criminal enterprise known to man--an enterprise
that involves millions of peasant farmers in the mountains of
Asia, thousands of corrupt government officials, disciplined
criminal syndicates, and agencies of the United States
government. America's heroin addicts are the final link in a
chain of secret criminal transactions that begin in the opium
fields of the "Golden Triangle" --northeastern Burma, northern
Thailand, and northern Laos--pass through clandestine heroin
laboratories, and enter the United States through a maze of
international smuggling routes.
Most opium grown in Burma is cultivated in the remote
hills of northeastern Shan State, and along the Laotian/Thai
border. The area has been ambiguously controlled for more
than two decades by the CPB, the Shan United Army, and a dozen
other rebel groups, each carving a small chunk of power from
the undeveloped region. Therefore, Shan state was, for all
intents and purposes, beyond the reach of Rangoon.
Phantom villages exist in this disputed land, where
villagers live under deplorable conditions and are forced to
grow poppy because not much more can survive the harsh climate
in the hills. Traditionally, these villagers lived and farmed
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in the fertile valleys, growing soybeans, paddy, vegetables
and fruit. Little-by-little they have been pushed out of the
valleys and into the mountains by the civil war. This
partially explains the tenfold increase in opium production in
the past decade.
B. ORIGINS OF THE TRADE
It is uncertain when poppies were first introduced to
these areas, but most probably they were imported from China's
neighboring Yunnan province in the 19th century, when the
opium trade flourished in China. Kokang and the Wa Hills,
where 90% of the population is ethnic Chinese, has
historically been an important center for both poppy
cultivation and opium trading.
The business was permitted during British rule and taxed
by the colonial authorities, but it was strictly regulated
under Burma's 1923 Opium Act."' Opium was later banned after
Burma gained independence in 1948, but Rangoon's writ barely
extended beyond the Salween River. Remnants of China's
defeated nationalists, the Kuomintang (KMT), were seeking
refuge east of the Salween, from the victorious communists.
The KMT set up its own fiefdoms along the Chinese border and
enlisted the support of local warlords. Opium was sold in
62 Bertil Lintner, "Tax Revenue Helps Finance the Party",
Far Eastern Economic Reviev (4 June 1987), 27.
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Thailand to finance raids across the border into China and to
meet other KMT needs
.
The precipitous collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek's
government in 1949 convinced President Truman's administration
that it had to take action to stem the tide of Red aggression.
In 1950 the CIA began regrouping remnants of the defeated KMT
army in Burma's Shan state and in Laos for an invasion back
into China. 63
With CIA support, the KMT remained in Burma--providing
intelligence information on the Communists in China--until
1961, when a major Burmese army offensive drove them into Laos
and Thailand. By this time, however, the KMT had already
become deeply entrenched in opium trafficking."" Much of the
cultivation has remained under the control of the 3rd and 5th
Chinese Irregular Force (CIF) , headed by Gen. Lee Wan Huan
.
Now numbering fewer than 2,000 troops, the CIF is a descendant
of a force of nationalist Kuomintang troops driven out of
China and into Burma in 1949. Turning to the heroin trade to
finance several aborted invasions of China in the early
1950 's. Although the KMT failed in their three attempted
invasions, they were very successful in developing a
comprehensive opium marketing empire. '" The Kuomintang
McCoy, 339 .
; IBID. , 3
Bertil Lintner, "Pushing at the Door", Far East- n
Economic Revi. .. (28 March 1991) 28.
troops gradually degenerated into full-time traffickers. They
are usually the ones given the credit for centralizing the
opium marketing structure--forcing hill tribes to pay an
annual opium tax, establishing the trade routes over the
borders into northern Thailand, and imported chemists from
Hong Kong to set up refineries. By the late 1960 's they were
providing 99% pure heroin from their secret jungle
laboratories to their contacts in Bangkok, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan
.
The KMT caravans were able to penetrate deep into Shan
territory because the Burmese military had their hands full
fighting insurgents. Recognizing this, the KMT began funding
several smaller Shan rebel groups; while not allowing them to
grow very strong, at the very least the ploy added to the
confusion in the region thus drawing attention from the KMT
activities. The KMT had also been given free reign for their
operations in northern Thailand, in exchange for protecting
Thailand's northern approach from encroachment and




Despite countless minor variations, all of Asia's poppy
farmers use the same basic techniques when they cultivate the
opium poppy. The annual crop cycle begins in late summer or
early fall as the farmers scatter handfuls of tiny poppy seeds
across the surface of their hoed fields. At maturity the
greenish-colored poppy plant has one main tubular stem, which
stands about three or four feet high, and perhaps half a dozen
to a dozen smaller stems. About three months after planting,
each stem produces a brightly colored flower; gradually the
petals drop to the ground, exposing a green pod about the size
and shape of a small chicken egg. For reasons still
unexplained by botanists, the seed pod synthesizes a milky
white sap soon after the petals have fallen away. This sap is
opium, and the farmers harvest it by cutting a series of
shallow parallel incisions across the bulb's surface with a
special curved, three bladed knife. As the sap seeps out of
the incisions and congeals on the bulbs surface, it changes to
a brownish-black color. The next morning the farmer collects
the opium by scraping off the bulb with a flat, dull knife. 67
Even in this high-tech modern age, raw opium is still
moved from the poppy fields to the morphine refineries on
horseback and human porters. There are few roads in the
McCoy, 12.
underdeveloped mountainous growing regions of Burma, and even
where there are roads, traffickers tend to avoid them to evade
police and army patrols. Most traffickers prefer to do their
morphine refining close to the poppy fields, since compact
morphine bricks are much easier to smuggle than bundles of
pungent jelly-like opium. Although they are separated by over
four thousand miles, criminal "chemists" of the Middle East
and Southeast Asia use roughly the same technique to extract
pure morphine from opium.
The chemists begin the process by heating water in an oil
drum over a wood fire. Next, raw opium is dumped into the
drum and stirred until it dissolves. Then at the right moment
the chemist adds ordinary lime fertilizer to the solution,
precipitating out organic waste and leaving the morphine
suspended in a chalky white water near the surface. An
ordinary piece of flannel cloth is used to filter the water,
removing any residual waste matter; the chemist then pours the
solution into another oil drum. As the solution is heated and
stirred a second time, concentrated ammonia is added, causing
the morphine to solidify and drop to the bottom. Once more
the solution is filtered leaving chunky white kernels of
morphine on the cloth. When dried and packaged for shipment,
the pitzu (coarse morphine) usually weighs about 10% of what
the raw opium from which it was extracted weighed. t!
Alvin Moscow, Merchants of Heroin (New York: The Dial
Press, 1968) 61-63.
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The heroin refining process is a good deal more
complicated, and requires the supervision of a chemist. Since
the end of World War II, Marseilles and Hong Kong have
established themselves as the major centers for heroin
laboratories. However, since the KMT gained dominance of the
market they been challenged by heroin laboratories located
within Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, primarily inside
Burma's porous borders. Most laboratories are staffed by a
three man team consisting of an experienced master chemist and
two apprentices. In most cases the master chemist is really
a master chef who has simply memorized the complicated five
part recipe after several years as an assistant . The goal of
the five stage process is to chemically bind morphine
molecules with acetic acid and then process the compound to




From the Golden Triangle the heroin is shipped over one
of several routes. The first route crosses into Yunnan
province China. Much of the narcotics brought into Yunnan is
not intended for local consumption, but is transported to Hong
Kong or to other international ports to be shipped to the
West. Tighter enforcement in Southeast Asia apparently has
made China a more viable alternate shipping route from Burma




China. 71 The addiction problem in China is still relatively
minor, but there is growing concern as more younger people
turn toward recreational use of narcotics. 71
A second route travels through northern Burma to the
Indian border region. Once over the border, the shipment will
be sold in the region, or it will continue on to Calcutta,
Madras, or port cities in Bangladesh. The increase in
narcotics trafficking is seen by the Indian government as a
threat to their national security as local usage continues to
increase dramatically. However, the majority of narcotics
shipped through India is destined for export to the West .
The third primary route takes the heroin directly across
the Thai border, which is where most of America's Asian
heroin, until recently, has originated. Although Thailand's
own production is small compared to that of its neighbors,
Thailand plays an increasingly important role. Anti-narcotics
officials say 40-50% of the heroin flowing into the U.S., and
80% of the heroin reaching New York City is from the Golden
Triangle, 7 and Thailand provides convenient routes for drugs
J Nicholas D. Kristof , "Heroin Use Spreads in China Among
the Curious Or Bored", New York Times (21 March 1991) Al
.
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destined for sea and air terminals to the U.S. and other
international markets. Additionally, their role in the
financing of the trade has increased dramatically.
Thailand's well developed infrastructure has made that
country the crucial link in the region's narcotic trade. An
extensive road, rail, shipping, and telecommunications
network, as well as booming trade and travel connections with
the rest of the world, have made Thailand the main transit
point for the international drug trade. Thai officials
respond with denials and demands for greater efforts by the
U.S. government to suppress the demand for drugs instead of
discrediting Thailand.
Alarmed at a rapid increase in heroin trafficking from
Southeast Asia, Western officials have recently warned that
Thailand risks being corrupted and "stigmatized" as Columbia
has been unless stronger steps are taken to stop transhipment
of drugs to other countries. The governments of Malaysia and
Singapore already regard narcotics abuse as a potential threat
to national security and have imposed a mandatory death
penalty for traffickers. Thailand has been slower to see the
problem in this same light and many Western officials are
worried that the authorities in Bangkok may be doing too
little, too late. Lastly, evidence strongly suggests that
there are high ranking Thai military and government officials
who continue to profit enormously from smuggling narcotics
out through their country. These people have a powerful
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interest in insuring that the narcotics trade is perpetuated,
often exerting significant influence in the Shan State and
border regions with Thailand. 74
D. A POLICY OF COLLUSION
Unable to deal with both narcotics traffickers and
insurgents simultaneously, Rangoon has opted to focus on the
insurgents. Evidence shows the government has made alliances-
-similar to the agreements that established the Ka Kwe v e
(KKY) , or government milit ia--with various trafficking
organizations to allow the army to free-up troops which then
can be redeployed to quell the discontent in the cities and to
fight the main insurgent threats--the Karen and the Kachin
.
The government has provided additional support by securing
precursor chemicals, providing security forces for the new
refineries, allowing free passage of narcotics in government
controlled areas and protection in rebel controlled territory
and money laundering in the state banking system.'-
The distribution of narcotics is now shifting heavily
into China's Yunnan providence. The major growing region
adjacent to Yunnan province is controlled by the Wa and Shan
74 William H. Overholt, "Dateline Drug Wars: Burma: The
Wrong Enemy", Foreign Policy , no. 77 (Winter 1989-90) 173.
A series of interviews with officials within various
U.S. Government organizations and a Burmese student, living




factions of the, now defunct, CPB. Once a secondary route,
this has become the major outlet for Burmese heroin because of
the new government complicity to the trafficking. The border
is controlled by the Burmese 99th Light Infantry Division--the
unit responsible for the brutal slaughter of pro-democracy
demonstrators in Rangoon in September 1988; free access has
been granted to the traffickers in exchange for their promise
to abstain from becoming involved in any insurgent movement
.
Dozens of refineries are now in operation; the stream of
heroin out of Burma has turned to a flood, while the
government in Rangoon appears unable, or unwilling, to do
anything about it. This is partly due to the political
instability that has dominated the capital since the riots and
subsequent military coup in 1988.
Despite the growth and modernization of the Burmese
military, the country remains a collection of fiefdoms ruled
by traditional tribal chiefs, insurgents, drug lords, military
regional commanders, and black marketeers. Control of these
remote regions shifts between them as alliances are made and
broken
.
The following discussion of Burma's druglords will shed
some light on the confused state of conditions which have
allowed the trade to flourish. The industry's pioneers, the
KMT, have already been viewed for their contribution to the
growth of the trade and the subsequent impact of the
additional instability of the region. Subsequent analysis of
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the Golden Triangle will contemplate the principal role of
Khun Sa, alleged kingpin of the opium trade. The most recent
leaders of the industry, emerging from the rubble of the once
powerful CPB, will also be addressed.
F. BURMA'S DRUGLORDS
Until recently as much as 90% of the heroin from Burma
has been under the control of a single opium warlord: an
enigmatic, notorious figure, alias Khun Sa . Born Chang Chi-fu
in 1934, Khun Sa heads the Shan United Army (SUA), a heavily
armed force estimated to be as many as 15,000 strong, which
controls a 200-kilometer stretch of the Burmese-Thai border
were most of the refineries are located. 7 ' Kicked out of
Thailand in 1982, he now operates out of' a fortified
headquarters in the Doi Lang mountain range only a few
kilometers inside Burma.
With his main rivals largely destroyed, Khun Sa became
the first of the Golden Triangle warlords to be worthy of the
various media titles-- " Prince of Darkness", "King of the
Jungle", and "King of the Opium Trade". In 1986 the Far
Eastern Economic Review estimated that Khun Sa ' s army
transported and refined as much as 80% of the Golden
Triangle's opium harvest/ With the SSA broken, the CPB in
76 McCoy, 3 88.
Bertil Lintner, Far Eastern Review (20 February 1986
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ruins, and the KMT at its weakest point in more than three
decades, this estimate of Khun Sa ' s influence may even be
conservative. The State Department suggests that Khun Sa may
control as much as 60% of the world's illicit opium supply. 78
While Khun Sa admits to being involved in the drug trade,
he insists that he is the leader of a nationalist movement and
the recognized chief of the 8 million Shan people. Claiming
to tax only the opium that passes through his territory so
that he can feed his people, Khun Sa has repeatedly offered to
abandon the heroin trade if the United States will pay him
U.S. $100 million a year, for six years, and assist him with a
crop substitution program to provide a source of income for
his people.
For their part, both Bangkok and Washington continue to
regard Khun Sa as a criminal, and the SUA as his personal
security force. The Thai government has put a U.S. $25, 000
price on his head, despite several decades of overt connivance
with the druglord. Washington, for its part, has indicted him
on 10 counts of narcotics trafficking and racketeering.
Khun Sa has other enemies as well. Some of the armed
rebels in northern Burma, such as the various remnants of the
CPB, and the Shan State Army (SSA) , are occupied with
U.S. State Department, Bureau of International
Narcotics Matters (INM) , International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (1990) 286.
66
smuggling heroin north into India and China and rarely clash
with Khun Sa . On the other hand, there is almost constant
skirmishing in the hotly contested areas along the eastern
border with Thailand, where a half-dozen groups including the
WA and Pa-o insurgencies vie for control of the heroin trade.
This kaleidoscope of constantly shifting alliances among the
traffickers, insurgents, and Burmese government forces allows
very little stability to exist in the Shan state. Some groups
that used to fight are now working together; next week, they
may be adversaries again, fighting for control of the caravan
routes and power over the hill farmers. 7 ' It is a business,
and in this business, all is fair.
Among Khun Sa ' s most bitter competitors is the Wa
National Army (WNA) , which is also heavily dependent on the
opium trade for its financial support. The WNA has become
much stronger recently, combining with f act ions--predominantly
Wa troops--of the now defunct CPB. The Wa, who were once
feared headhunters 80
,
have been gaining control of the
growing region along the Chinese border near Kokang. 01
Interview with Mr. Eric Sandburg of the Burma desk at
the U.S. State Department, September 1991.
Bureau of International Narcotics Matters,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Mid-Year
Update (September 1991) 56.
The Wa are believed to be the original inhabitants of
this region; many of the local rulers in Burma and northern




Conflicts between the WNA and the SUA have been heating up in
recent years, often spilling over into Thailand. With the new
ex-CPB alliances, it is believed the Wa have greater access to
precursor chemicals from China, and have taken advantage of
deals with the Burmese military which give them unequaled
freedom to market their opium.
As the pressures against Khun Sa mounted in 1989-1990,
the Burmese seem to have already prepared an heir to his
empire. When the CPB broke up, Rangoon exploited the split to
revive Lo Hsing-han as the opium warlord of the northern Shan
state. Only nine days after the disintegration of the CPB, Lo
Hsing-han was welcomed back to Kokang state by the same
leaders who had driven him out in 1968. After he met with
Burmese army officials in Lashio, Lo ' s new opium army opened
seventeen new heroin refineries in Kokang and began to
challenge Khun Sa for control of the northern Shan opium
harvest. 8J Lo is believed to ship his heroin through China,
instead of Thailand.
The SLORC seems to be employing the rule of "divide and
conquer". As each group or warlord becomes too powerful,
Rangoon reshuffles its arrangements to allow it to bring its
own strength against its foe. Many of the Wa mutineers, to
the delight of Rangoon, have turned their attention to
fighting Khun Sa for control of the lucrative trade. This
82 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Narcotics Matters,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (1990) mx6.
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helps to explain the emergence of several other competing drug
lords
.
Until a few years ago, nearly all of the laboratories--
where raw opium is refined into no. 4 heroin--were located
along Burma's eastern border with Thailand. This had always
been Khun Sa ' s bailiwick, and until recently he was the most
powerful opium warlord in the Golden Triangle. Now, however,
despite the State Department's assessment, he seems to be
losing ground to a new generation of more influential and
better-connected warlords in Burma's northern Kokang area,
adjacent to Yunnan. A string of new refineries have been
established in this region, putting them closer to the poppy
fields in northern Shan state, the potentially enormous
Chinese market and seemingly easier routes to the outside
world. 83
This new heroin empire has emerged in the wake of two
important political events in Burma over the past few years:
the ruling military's brutal crushing of a popular uprising
for democracy in 1988 and a mutiny among the rank and file of
the country's then most powerful insurgent group, the
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) . When the Burmese military
moved in and reasserted power on 18 September 1988 after weeks
of ant i -government demonstrations, its main fear was that the
pro-democracy movement might gain access to arms with which to
8i Bertil Lintner, "Triangular Ties", Far Eastern Economic
Rev lev (28 March 19 91) 22.
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confront the newly installed military regime. The military,
acting quickly, has allowed some former CPB foes to form local
militia; by doing so they are permitted to continue their
trafficking without government interference--in return the
militia agreed not to give other insurgents or dissidents
weapons or assistance. Rangoon also benefits as it gains a
tremendous source of revenue, for their on-going military
modernization program, by taxing the profitable heroin trade.
A recent article in the Far Eastern Economic Review cited
intelligence sources which name six former CPB commanders --in
addition to Lo Hsing-han--who have taken advantage of the
mutually favorable and very lucrative arrangements made with
the Rangoon government since the break-up of the CPB in
19 89. 84
The demise of Khun Sa may be near; however, his capture
will have little impact on the heroin trade. Like the poppies
grown in the hills, Khun Sa is a product of the Golden
Triangle. At one time, he was armed by the CIA, trained by
the KMT, and protected at various times by both the Burmese
and Thai governments. He has drawn his strength from the
complicity and shifting loyalties of the powerful forces in
the region. If his should collapse, another organization will
take his place to provide a continuous supply of "Asian White"
to feed the world's growing hunger for heroin. An end to the
84 Bertil Lintner, "The New Dealers", Far Eastern Economic
Review (28 March 1991) 26.
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political instability and economic decay must precede efforts




VII. ARMS TRANSFERS: THE FALLOUT IN BURMA
A. A NEW APPROACH
On June 18, 1989, the SLORC issued a ruling that
henceforth the official name of the country (in English) would
be Myanmar. Myanmar is a translation of what has been the
official name in Burmese since independence in 1947. The new
name was meant to imply no ethnic connotations, and a new
approach to thinking about the problem of national unity in an
ethnically diverse society that has been plagued by ethnic
separatist movements and insurgencies since 1948.
To many, however, the name change was only camouflage for
"politics-as-usual". Critics argued that the military coup of
September 18, 1988 was a phony. Power had not changed hands
because the BSPP had always been an instrument of the army and
General Ne Win, and the coup merely removed the discredited
party from the formal structure of power. Furthermore,
critics contend that unless a civilian government is
established, new policies not intended primarily to serve the
interests of the military elite are impossible. This, of
course, was the basis of the political demands during the 1988
demonstrations--for the establishment of an interim civilian




In view of the failure of any government since
independence to implement economic, social and other policies
to effectively develop the country's human and natural
resources, a new social and political order is needed. How to
establish a fresh working relationship between state and
society was at the heart of politics in 1989, and continues to
be a primary focus today. In the face of extensive foreign
and domestic criticism, the military government has pursued
its agenda with a single-minded determination to develop a
different economic order, while ensuring that political
liberalization takes place in an orderly environment securely
in their control . The nature of that order will be determined
by the military, and that has caused deep mistrust, dissent,
and the continued ruination of the economy. The heart of the
new government's rebuilding program is the enhancement of its
military, to the detriment of the economy. Without a strong
military to control the population, the government feels the
country would fragment into autonomous regions which would
then be left to the mercy of the outside world.
Before the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, Burma's armed
forces totaled between 185-190,000 men. In late 1990, the
figure had risen to 230,000, today it is believed to be closer
to 280,000 and the aim, according to well-informed sources in
Rangoon, is to reach 300,000 before the end of the year. "We
have reports indicating that the final goal is a 500,000
strong, well -equipped military regime," a Rangoon-based
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observer said. But the present build-up does not seem to be
aimed primarily at enhancing their traditional counter-
insurgency role. 8 ' The 1988 pro-democracy uprising in the
urban areas of central Burma, and its extension in the May
election victory for the main opposition National League for
democracy (NLD) party, has given the armed forces the new role
of consolidating and, if possible, perpetuating the military's
grip on power in Rangoon. 8 ' To strengthen the armed forces
for its new mission, the SLORC has initiated a major build-up
and modernization program.
A US$1. 3-1. 4 billion buying spree of a squadron of jet
fighters, navy patrol boats, over a hundred light and medium
tanks and APCs, as well as anti-aircraft guns, rocket
launchers, and assorted small arms by the Burmese armed forces
has been undertaken. Well-placed sources in Rangoon say
Beijing sent about 100 light and medium tanks to Burma,
including T69IIs and the Chinese version of the Soviet PT76
light amphibious tank, in addition to a substantial number of
armored personnel carriers (APC) . Also included in the deal
were some 20 to 30 Chinese 37mm twin barrel and single barrel
57mm anti-aircraft guns. 8. The Burmese have paid something
Bertil Lintner, "Lock and Load", Far Eastern Economic
Review (13 September 1990) 28.
86 Bertil Lintner, "Oiling the Iron Fist", Far Eastern
Economic Review (6 December 1990) 28.
87 IBID.
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more than the "friendship prices" originally envisaged and,
according to intelligence sources, had to pay US$400 million
in cash, up front for the equipment. "Burma simply doesn't
have that kind of money now," a political analyst asserted."'
Yet it does, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
Other suppliers have also jumped at the chance to sell
weapons and supplies for Burma's build-up. A recent arms
purchase from Pakistan for about US$20 million worth of small
arms was delivered in late May. In addition, the Yugoslavs
are believed to have struck a barter deal for weapons, and
Yugoslav mining experts are looking into the prospect of
revitalizing dormant gold mines around Mandalay. Why does the
Burmese Government need this level of sophisticated weaponry?
Because it is essential to solving their current problems--at
least according to the SLORC. To raise the morale of the
military the SLORC believes a modern army is the key. Another
reason is to intimidate the public--tanks and APCs are
certainly great for crowd control. The SLORC realizes the
military has become estranged from the population. Pedestrian
overpasses were built in Rangoon at strategic intersections
within the city for greater safety during rush hour. The only
problem is, Rangoon does not have enough vehicular traffic to
constitute this as a viable need; however, they do make




into crowds. A stronger military will allow more control of
the population, while they deal with the troublesome
insurgencies along the border regions.
A recent article in the Rangoon "Working People's Daily",
written by Mya Win summarized the immensity of the charge the
SLORC has contrived as their duty to the nation:
The State Law and Order Restoration Council had
especially to combat all embracing demands and to concentrate
its attention to protect programmes for building of a nev;
nation. It had to thwart all bids to secure State power
through a short-cut and concentrate its attention to writing
a constitution that would meet the aspirations of the masses.
The State Lav/ and Order Council has to desperately defend
itself against all political, military and sabotage attacks
launched by multi-colour insurgents; against attacks of
foreign 'rightist' elements; against confrontations in all
forms perpetrated by internal 'leftist' and 'rightist' forces.
And while doing so it has also to advance from stage to stage,
with due regard to historical and legal requirements along the
road to a multi-party democracy. In other words, the State
Law and Order Restoration Council is performing the duties of
a reforming and rebuilding government during this transitory
period. These characteristics stand on a much higher plane
than the characteristics of an ordinary interim government . . .
,
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like the one in 1958 that only rode over a political storm and
restored normalcy.
B. NEW TACTICS FOR MODERNIZATION
After crushing all organized civilian opposition inside
Burma, the SLORC has now successfully neutralized several of
the country's border insurgencies as well. The government has
been able to do this for the most part with promises of
development schemes and political concessions, reflecting a
new approach to the country's decades-long insurgencies.
The new policy was first put into practice following the
disintegration of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) in the
spring of 1989, when the hill-tribe guerrillas drove the aging
communist leadership into exile in China. Rather than
striking the weakened splinter groups with a military
offensive, as has been the Burmese tactic in the past, Rangoon
struck deals which allowed the hill tribes to keep their
weapons, maintain control in their respective regions, and
engage in various economic activit ies--primarily heroin
production--unhindered. In exchange they promised not to take
up arms against government forces, but instead help government
forces fight Khun Sa and the Shan United Army. Although, the
agreements are in place they offer only a tenuous peace; there
is still no significant government presence in the area.
9 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "SLORC's 'Nation
Building' Role Discussed" (FBIS-EAS-91-092 , 13 May 1991) 29.
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The SLORC's main goal has been to neutralize the border
insurgencies and to prevent urban dissidents from getting
access to arms and ammunition. Tens of thousands of troops
have been freed from counter-insurgency duties and redeployed
in the urban areas of central Burma since the cessation of
hostilities in traditionally rebellious Shan state. This new
'linear strategy' is allowing the military to divide and
conquer. 90
The dry season--January through mid-April--usually marks
the beginning of the Burmese army offensive against the rebel
groups operating in the border areas. The past few years have
been a little different than previous years, with the heaviest
fighting in the northern Kachin state and in the Thai border
region, against the Kachin and Karen, respectively. The
difference is that a better equipped military has been able to
push the insurgents from their traditional strongholds along
the border. For decades the Burmese army was a poorly
equipped but comparatively effective light infantry force
which concentrated almost all its efforts on combating various
insurgent forces under harsh conditions in the country's
remote frontier areas. Quite often 50%, of the Burmese troops
sent into the field would be without weapons, and most were
all too happy to avoid conflicts with better equipped rebel
The phrase 'linear strategy' means to placate or
otherwise neutralize the majority of opposition forces, while
concentrating efforts at destroying a few key troublesome
adversaries, namely the Karen and the Kachin.
forces. Although they were an aggressive force, without
weapons, they were no match for the insurgents.
Today, only four major insurgencies persist--the main
Kachin Independence Arm (KIA) in Kachin state, the Karen
National Union (KNXJ) ; the New Mon State Party; and the All-
Burma Students Democratic Front, which has units along the
Thai border, as well as in Kachin state. 91 Once the military
has quelled the remaining insurgencies, they will more than
likely turn their attention back to these other regions-
breaking these fragile agreements of convenience with the Wa,
Pa-O, Palaung, and fragments of the KIA--to quiet the
subversive minorities.
When stability is finally delivered to the countryside,
the SLORC plans to tackle their economic problems. The
decades of Ne Win's authoritarian rule and his "Burmese Way to
Socialism" --an idiosyncratic mix of isolationist know-
nothingism, numerology, and nepotism- -has reduced Burma to the
status of a pauper nation. However, now the military regime
appears to be committed to a sustained modernization of their
armed forces, despite evidence that the build-up is taking a
further toll on the economy.
Bertil Lintner, "Spiking the Guns", Far Eastern
Economic Review (23 May 1991) 12-13.
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C. FUNDING THE BUILD-UP
How is Rangoon funding this tremendous multi -bill ion
dollar build-up? Western governments had cut off aid and have
discouraged investment since the brutality of September 1988.
Unable to borrow funds from foreign banks or government
agencies, Rangoon seems content to mortgage Burma's future by
selling off its valuable resources at bargain store prices.
When General Chaovolit Yongchaiyuth, the Thai Army
commander and Deputy Prime Minister, visited Burma and
returned with generous logging, gem, and fishing deals,
Burma's financial picture suddenly changed. A total of 40
logging concessions gave Thailand access to one of the
world's last great teak forests. 92 A briefing document
written by the Burmese Government's Timber Corp in February
1989 said that 20 concession areas had been contracted along
the Thai-Burma border with total exports of 160,000 tonnes of
teak logs and 500,000 tonnes of other hardwood logs
authorized
.
Growth for the past three years has been due primarily to
the export of timber, fisheries, and other resource extraction
investments--teak accounted for more than 32% of Burma's total
exports in 1990. Timber Corp. estimated revenues of
'" James Pringle, "Thai Loggers Rape Burma Teak Forest",
London Times (29 May 1990) 17A
Jonathan Friedland and Bertil Lintner, "A Policy of
Pillage", Far Eastern Economic Review (8 August 1991) 56-58.
US$112 million a year from the logging--this amount was later
doubled with the granting of 20 additional concessions--a
bonanza by the scale of Burma's foreign trade.'
Virtually broke and with no foreign aid available to them
the SLORC also invited foreign businesses back to Burma to
invest--hoping to raise funds for their regime. Foreign oil
interests--ignoring the Western governments' calls for an
embargo on trade and investment --have also responded to the
Burmese opening their borders for exploration and development.
This onshore investment opportunity was a major change in
Burmese economic policy, signaling a shift toward some
economic liberalization, in light of their past phobia of
foreign domination. More importantly, however, it indicated
the dire financial straits of the military regime, which
insisted on a substantial signature bonus of up to $5 million.
The accuracy of the onshore geological surveys, while
generally believed to be legitimate, have not been proven to
date. Few, if any, new reserves have been discovered since
the concessions were opened to foreign exploration. However,
the 10 oil companies have spent an estimated US$440 million
since 1989. The government appears to have thrown all its
apples into the exploration and discovery of vast on-shore oil
reserves. It has gone so far as to mortgage its future
94 Hamish McDonald, "Partners in Plunder", Far Eastern
Economic Review (22 February 1990) 17.
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puchasing vast quantities of modern weapons from the Chinese
government for a percentage of the oil production.
D. OPIUM: A NEW SOURCE OF INCOME
There is strong suspicion in Western narcotics control
agencies that Rangoon has taken a more direct hand in the
opium trade. The government's recent media-hype, highlighting
the destruction of a heroin refinery, was a staged event to
entice the U.S. into renewing the funding for anti-narcotics
programs. 91 Western narcotics agencies remain distanced from
Rangoon. Recent military operations in the northern Shan
state captured a large portion of the prime poppy cultivation
region. Rangoon has in the past had a working agreement with
the Shan drug-lord, Khun Sa . If he would help Rangoon fight
other ethnic rebels, they would not interfere with his opium
trade. Until recently, there had been no known battles with
Khun Sa ' s forces/' 1 This relationship seems to be changing;
the government is now working closely with remnants of the
shattered CPB forces in the Wa Hills to fight Khun Sa . As
part of their linear strategy the Burmese government cannot
allow any adversary to get too strong. Khun Sa has enjoyed
free reign long enough, his contacts with Thai northern
FBIS
' Hodding Carter IV, "King of the Jungle", M INC. (March
1991) 88.
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regional commanders have become too strong, therefore his
domination must be diminished.
This past year's opium crop yielded an estimated record
2,500 metric tonnes of opium' 7 (intelligence sources claim
even this number is too low) --when processed this equates to
about 250 metric tonnes of heroin, with a New York street
value of well over $125 billion. 98
Rangoon has always had a wavering commitment to anti-
narcotics operations. Eliminating illegal narcotics and black
market trade adversely affects hill tribes and urban dwellers
alike. The Burmese economy is so poor that Rangoon has little
to offer the hill tribes as substitutes for their opium crops.
The vast majority of consumer items, including medications,
are available only through the black market. Elimination of
these trades would increase unrest among the population. The
government 'officially' wants to enforce anti-narcotics
policies, but it realizes that to do so would alienate many
people and increase the support for the insurgents.
Additionally, corrupt military and government officials would
continue to work against measures to suppress narcotics and
other cross border trafficking, since they reap great rewards
for their involvement in the trade.
Steven J. Hedges, "The Dragon Lady's Revenge", U.S.
News and World Reports (2 July 1990) 27.
This figure was quoted during an interview with a DEA
agent--it is also consistent with the Hedges article in U.S.
News and World Report (2 July 1990) 27.
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Conflicting political and economic factors muddle the
government's narcotics policies and preclude the development
of clear objectives for the military as well. Losses of
equipment and men in anti-narcotics operations is unacceptable
to military leaders, and has an equally negative impact on the
morale of the soldiers. On the other hand, the Burmese
government is dedicated to preventing insurgents and narcotics
traffickers from gaining a sufficient power base from which to
overthrow the government or secede from the union. Military
leaders are committed to this goal; this also helps to explain
the emergence of new, powerful drug lords along the border
regions. The army has the ability to contain the insurgents
and narcotics traffickers, but it has not been able muster the
strength to defeat them.
E. BURMA'S INTERNAL SECURITY
In developed, industrialized countries the distinction
between 'defense' and 'internal security' is fairly clear-cut,
in terms of both budgetary allocations by the government and
the forces involved in defending the state against external
and internal threats. In the Third World, on the other hand,
the military is often much more closely involved in
maintaining internal security. Not only are internal threats
often substantially more serious than in the developed world,
frequently taking the form of large-scale, long-term
insurgencies by ideologically-motivated revolutionaries, or
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ethnically-motivated separatists, but also the armed forces
are frequently involved in the administration of the
government itself, and use their own military potential to
maintain their hold on power.
This is exactly the situation found in Burma today. The
Pro-democracy movement of 1988 forced the Burmese government
to take decisive action--in the form of brutal repression. In
the subsequent elections, whether the SLORC miscalculated the
public's ant i -government feeling, or used the elections to
flush out the remaining opposition leaders is inconsequential.
The important fact is that all political opposition was
eliminated-- with the help of the "free and fair" elections of
May 1990. More than a thousand NLD organizers and others in
opposition have been arrested since last years polls. An
estimated 300, including 10 elected candidates, have fled to
the Thai border and established a parallel government. Having
effectively dismantled the NLD, the SLORC and Burma's
Directorate of the Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) now
appear intent on extending control over civil servants and
those candidates who are still at large." Divide and
conquer remains the preferred technique.
Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house
arrest, after two years and one-half years, for 'acts against
the government'. She is seen as the only person that has the
Bertil Lintner, "Off With Their Heads" Far Eastern
Economic Reviev ( 9 May 1991) 9-10.
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charisma, the power, and the talent to unite the Burman
majority with the ethnic minorities to topple the present
military regime. She has resisted pressure from the SLORC to
leave the country, and give up politics, opting instead to
remain under house arrest in protest to the brutal repression
of the SLORC.
Winning the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize gave legitimacy to
Aung San Suu Kyi's crusade, and brought to the forefront of
international concern the plight of Burma. Her strength has
given the Burmese the will to resist the continued repression
by its own government. Without her strength and conviction--
her charisma--the Burmese people and ethnic minorities have
little chance of gaining their democratic freedom.
While Aung San Suu Kyi remains incarcerated, the only
major threat to the SLORC appears to be a rekindling of pro-
democracy student activism. In response Major General Khin
Nyunt, head of DDSI, has vowed severe retaliatory actions for
any anti-government unrest by the students. He has vowed
the student protests which paralysed Burma in 1988 would not
be repeated. The stunned country watched as the military
moved in to suppress the demonstrations with guns and
bayonets, and has since been bullied into submission.
However, the demonstrations are beginning to reappear; on
"AFP: Junta Remains Fearful of Student Unrest",
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-EAS-91-065-A, 4
April 1991) 29.
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12 December 1991 thousands of troops were rushed to Rangoon to
put down the protests. With renewed fervor the students are
demanding the release of their leader, Aung San Suu Kyi,
despite facing the bayonets of the SLORC's modern army.
F. REDRESSING PAST INJUSTICE
The military leadership's fear of retribution to redress
their past actions prevents them from coming to an accord with
the political opposit ion--which should not be misinterpreted
as 'insurgents'. Government spending appears almost solely
military-related. Official statistics from the Ministry of
Planning and Finance put defence expenditure at 32% of Burma's
budget for the fiscal year ended on 31 March, but independent
analysts put total-defence related spending at closer to 50%
of the Kyats 12 billion total. 101
There is considerable evidence that the resources which
have been devoted to counter-insurgency have failed to produce
the desired result of enhanced internal security. Given that
the majority of the insurgencies have risen from fundamental
economic, social and political inequity, they can only be
conquered by the Rangoon's willingness to implement
substantial reforms. The necessary improvements will most
likely not be forthcoming, because it is beyond the abilities
of those in power. "There are few people in the government
101 Friedland and Lintner, " A Policy of Pillage", 56-5;
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with any experience at all with market economics", a
multilateral bank economist says. "They simply do not have
the capacity to manage a workable economic programme. "'^
Although the application of military counter-insurgent
operations and local civic action projects may diminish some
of the immediate threats of the unrest, in the long-run, they
are often counter-productive. The government will gain little
favor by continuing to raze villages, hoping to smoke out
insurgents, or eliminate assistance to the rebels. Nor will
much progress be made by spending billions on weapons while
ignoring the socioeconomic problems of the countryside.
Abuses by the armed forces have stimulated additional
support for the insurgents along the border regions. Villages
have been shelled by artillery, and destroyed by air strikes
in massive suppression drives through insurgent territory--
forcing tens of thousands of refugees to flee towards the Thai
border. Locals, pressed into service as porters for the army,
brutally treated, tortured and starved, often never return.
Numerous reports of insurgents raping and pillaging hill tribe
villages frequently are cover-ups of further military abuses.
Historically, there is no love lost between the ethnic
minorities and the Burman majority--this may help to explain
why there was a lack of retaliatory action by the minority
insurgents after the 1988 demonstrations. History also
102 IBID.
reveals the lack of cooperation between minorities--of ten
fighting between themselves--has worked to their disadvantage.
Moreover without grassroots involvement in the definition
of local needs, local development programs undertaken as part
of the counter-insurgency campaign may not only fail to win
over the local population, but may actually alienate it even
further by increasing opportunities for corruption amongst
local authorities and military officers. Regional commanders,
who generally are not well educated, are seldom eager to take
responsible positions in Rangoon. They are making too much
money from up-country commerce. Officers are frequently
offered money, gems, and other gifts for turning a blind eye
to, or facilitating, narcotics and other contraband trade.'
While counter-insurgency policies based on military
repression and piecemeal civic action are unlikely to provide
final solutions to the insurgency problems, government
officials and military leaders have a vested interest in the
continuation of this type of approach. In the first place,
such a response implies that those who benefit from the
economic, political and social status quo need not relinquish
their privileges as part of the solution to the problem. For
the past thirty years, since Ne Win first took control of the
country, Burma has had a two class society, the privileged
military elite and the masses. Fears abound in the military
i Friedland and Lintner, "A Policy of Pillage", 56-58
8 9
that should a civilian government come to power in Rangoon,
the military will not only lose the privileges and standard of
living they have enjoyed, they will also be held accountable
for their past atrocities.
Second, by blaming the insurgency on criminally-motivated
and/or externally influenced terrorists rather than admitting
to the existence of basic socioeconomic and political
injustice, the SLORC is able to provide a justification for
the continuation of the authoritarian government and the
repression of human and political rights in the interests of
national security. The numerous misleading "news accounts" of
rebel forces committing atrocities in mountain villages, or
running afoul the laws in other ways are meant to discredit
the minorities and further alienate them from the Burman
majority--thus preventing them from joining forces against the
SLORC
.
Third, an approach based on military responses and 'civic
action ' --military tribunals--implemented under the auspices of
the armed forces gives the latter a seemingly vital
operational role, helping to ensure the continuing large-scale
diversion of national resources to the military, as well as
providing sustained opportunities for corruption, allowing




Since the 1960 's Burma has been known as the neutralist
nation "par excellence" . It attempted to balance between both
superpower polarization and the participants in the Sino-
Soviet split, although it had to pay special attention to
China. Burma withdrew from the Non-aligned Movement in 1979
when it moved--in Burma's view--too close to the Soviet Union.
Burma has refused to join ASEAN; they see the organization
being heavily influenced by the United States.
The SLORC's record of political and economic
mismanagement, human rights abuses, and unpredictability has
not been lost on Burma's neighbors. These nations have
adopted policies which have maintained cordial relationships,
exploited Burma's vast resources; in some cases, they have
revoked financial aid and support, and/or have suggested
reforms are needed. The discussion which follows will be
focused on the germane regional relationships.
A. CHINA: A GOOD FRIEND AND NEIGHBOR
China's relationship with Burma since 1949 has been, for
the most part, quite good. It has been facilitated by the
fact that for over 25 years China has dealt with the
government of Ne Win, and no other country can be said to have
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had such a consistently good relationship with the Peoples
Republic of China (PRO since 1949. Initially after coming to
power, the PRC attacked Burma and other neutralist countries
as reactionary bourgeoisie and lackeys of U.S. imperialism.
This phase of revolutionary enthusiasm soon gave way to a
policy that was aimed at cultivating relations with neutral
third world countries. This has been the mainstay of China's
policy toward Burma.
The Burmese, overwhelmed by China's economic and military
superiority and without counterbalancing allies, allowed the
Chinese to form a special relationship with them. They seemed
content to pay homage to China, in exchange for the trappings
of respect as an independent country and only a small amount
of intervention in their internal affairs. A treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation was signed in 1960 which settled a
bothersome border dispute--it was also instrumental in
propelling the Kachin into open revolt--between the two
countries. The most serious disruption of the neighborly
relationship came during the Cultural Revolution. Chinese
support for dissident movements in Burma tended to disrupt
public order and strained relations. The CPB was born in this
era of radicalism. Once the Cultural Revolution subsided,
however, the Chinese attempted to assuage Burmese
sensibilities and return to a more tranquil relationship.
Foreign interests in Burma have wavered between the legal
and illegal, and among Burma's proximate neighbors and more
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distant states. Because of a long indefensible border, Burma
has always looked with special attention at China with its
huge population. The changes in Burma coincided with the
internal liberalization of the Chinese economy that put China
in a position to be more responsive to new international
opportunities and innovative marketing. China found these in
Burma in the mid-1980 's. It was in their mutual interests to
foster expansion of this trade for mutual benefit .
When demonstrations and ant i -government protests broke
out in Burma in early 1988, finally culminating in brutal
suppression of the movement by Government forces, the Chinese
were faced with a new dilemma. On the one hand, they did not
want to jeopardize their good relations with the Burmese
government, and they had obvious interests in the continuation
of the status quo. On the other hand, it soon became obvious
that the disturbances were a serious threat to the government,
that they could continue, and that discontent was so deep in
Burmese society that the opposition might well be successful.
The incidents took place in the context of larger problems of
economic stagnation and political powerlessness afflicting
Burmese society. Against this general background, the
demonetization of 80% of the currency in the fall of 1987 had
alienated many groups, especially students.
Initial Chinese reaction was to disavow the existence of
the mass disturbances occurring in Burma--it was business as
usual. However, as the demonstrations and violence
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intensified Bejing was forced to admit the extent of the
unrest and the need for economic reforms and a change in
leadership--not necessarily a multi-party system or democracy.
Shortly after General Saw Maung took power and imposed
martial law in Burma on September 18, 1988, the Chinese ceased
reporting on the unrest and violence. China began to focus on
issues of a normal relationship, especially cross-border trade
and visiting delegations and leaders. Since Bejing was
unable--or unwilling--to influence the course of events in
Rangoon, it chose to make the best of a .bad situation and
repair its ties with the government.
Those ties have grown stronger as China and Burma have
consolidated control. The Burmese have undertaken significant
economic reform and cross-border trade, especially with China.
This new Chinese economic influence is accompanied, however,
by new problems: a budget deficit at 15% of GDP and inflation
running at 60-70%.
A senior Burmese military delegation visited China in
October 1989 indicating the early stages of a military
alliance between Bejing and Rangoon, signaling a shift in
Burma's non-aligned foreign policy. It remains to be seen
whether such a new relationship has developed beyond the level
of massive arms sales. India, which made its sympathies for
the protestors clear in 1988, would be a major loser in such
a situation.
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China's primary interest in its relations with Burma
seems to be the maintenance of good relations regardless of
the ideology of the government in power. The realist,
opportunistic approach taken by China protects her security
and economic interests by ensuring the presence of a friendly
neighbor on its southern boundary.
From Rangoon's vantage point there were also
strategic reasons for renewing relations. Placing the trade
routes to China back under Burmese control would not only
provide needed consumer goods to the Burmese urban
populations--whom the government needed to placate; it would
also place profits in the hands of those Rangoon wished to
reward, and deny the trade to the Kachin rebels and the other
insurgents active in the region. To this end the Rangoon and
Chinese authorities unobtrusively began to clear and hold the
critical trade routes between the two states in concerted
military operations on both sides of the border. 1 " 4 China
used the pretext of suppressing the drug trade, while quietly
offering the hardline BCP leaders a sound "retirement
opportunity" .
'
The volume of this Sino-Burmese trade has become highly
significant. It was regularized between the two states in
104 Lintner, Bertil, The Rise and Fall of the Burmese
Communist Party (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell





October 1988, by the SLORC- -although the plans had been made
by the previous government. Burma announced in December 1989
that the annual volume of this trade was about US$300 million-
-but observers estimate it at closer to US$1.5 billion. It
became almost half of all the smuggled trade in Burma, which
in itself probably totaled about 40% of GNP. 106 The
government has yet to fully capitalize on this trade, as much
of it is still in black market trade.
B. THAILAND: MILITARY BROTHERHOOD?
Thailand's motivation seems a bit more complex. In an
historical context, the brutality of prior Burmese invasions
of Thailand have never been forgotten. But of late, the
Burmese border was considered of secondary importance compared
with the borders with Cambodia and Laos due to the Thai's fear
of Vietnamese aggression. In spite of their neutralism, if
Rangoon would not establish a politically conservative
government, the next best option was to provide subtle support
for a low-level insurgency along the Thai-Burmese border.
With the border firmly in the hands of more moderate elements
Thailand was insulated from Rangoon--although, formal ties
were maintained between the two governments.
Beyond the economic gains and financial rewards for those
calling the shots are larger issues. Thailand is concerned
Steinburg, David I., "International Rivalries in
Burma", Asian Survey
, Vol. XXX, No . 6 (June 1990) 594.
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that a Burmese state under Chinese economic and military
influence would not only interfere with a "baht sphere of
influence" in Southeast Asia, but could also bring pressure on
Thailand from China on another front. Thus, the Thai economic
and security interests merged and dictated an active,
collaborative economic relationship with Burma.
The recent logging and fisheries concessions came at a
time when Thai lumber and fishing industries were on the verge
of shutdown. In November, 1988, Prime Minister Chatichai
Choonhaven ' s government revoked all logging concessions within
the Thai borders after heavy rains had devastated low-lying
areas with floods. The political turmoil which followed was
not resolved until the following month, when General Chaovalit
went to Rangoon- -less than three months after the bloodbath--
to barter for logging concessions.' Notable is the high
proportion of companies affiliated with high ranking Thai
military and government officials.
The Thai rush for resources in Burma has been
accomplished at the expense of the ethnic minorities whose
long struggle against the Rangoon government had formerly been
quietly supported by the Thai military as part of Bangkok's
own national security policy. Karen leaders nov; claim that
part of the economic deal involved Thailand assisting Burmese
troops to clear out ethnic minority groups, like themselves,
McDonald, Hamish, "Partners in Plunder", Far Eastern
Economic Reviev (22 February 1990) 16-17.
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and the Mon tribes, along the border. These groups have
financed their armed struggle against the Burmese regime by
small-scale logging, and taxing the lucrative black market
trade in gems, jade, and high-value consumer items which pass
through their check points.
Karen leaders and Burmese students, who fled Rangoon
after the military crackdown and have been living along the
border, claim that the Thai military has turned a blind eye to
Burmese troops crossing into Thai territory to attack their
camps. During the past rainy season, the Karen have lost
seven of their nine border strongholds, while the students
have lost their two main bases. 1( To keep the option of
reactivating the minority challenge to Rangoon alive, the Thai
army may not allow the Burmese to complete the sweep. The
main objective seems to have been to keep the trade routes
open--Chiang Rai, Mae Sot, Three Pagodas Pass, and Tanong--
with a secure area around them,'' 1 and to cut as much timber
for as long as it lasts or until the fragile relationship
crumbles
.
To protect their fishing fleet from pirates and other-
hazards, and secure their economic interests the Thai navy has
contracted with a German firm for the purchase of a helicopter
carrier. This carrier will extend their security zone out
108 IBID.
McDonald, Hamish, "Selling out Old Friends", Far
Eastern Economic Review (22 February 1990) 21-22.
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into the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. Beyond
protecting their fishing fleet the purchase of the carrier
will provide the center piece for Thailand's new naval force
structure. The force modernization program reflects a shift
in emphasis from internal security and counter-insurgency to
conventional warfare. This shift, prevalent throughout
Southeast Asia, is primarily due to the move towards declining
U.S. presence in the region. Border disputes, territorial
infractions, and protection of one's own economic and security
interests will depend one one's own military and diplomatic
capability. This carrier will provide much greater mobility
for the types of forces required in these new security roles.
Thai policy towards Burma, though on the surface
seemingly a military dominated foreign policy, is more focused
than previously thought. The Thais defend their actions and
argue that to enforce the economic embargo would plunge Burma
into anarchy and disintegration. This is the same approach
ASEAN has supported, hoping that positive engagement would
persuade the SLORC to mend its ways. This regional viewpoint
remains unconvincing; despite years of accommodating the SLORC
there has been no lessening of internal repression.
C. INDIA: THREATENED AMBITIONS
Although India is also a non-aligned nation, relations
with Burma have been complex. They are confused by the legacy
of the colonial period in which there was major Indian
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migration into Burma and Indian nationals had control over
much of the economy, and civil service.
The Burmese perceive India as a major threat to their
security. Their mutual border is home to several ethnic
minorities, including the Naga, Chin, and the Arakanese.
There are unconfirmed reports of Indian support to the Chin
and Naga rebels along the Indian-Burmese border.
Shortly after the 1962 coup, the military government,
began a campaign to eliminate Indian influence in the Burmese
economy, and some 200,000 people from the subcontinent were
forced to flee. New Dehli intervened with the threat of
force; some refugees were allowed to return, although most did
not. Ethnic minority persecution and human rights violations
are issues which have provided grounds for additional
antagonism between the two nations.
Relations have been further muddled by an increased
Indian strategic and military role in the region. India may
have additional motives for its antagonism to the present
Burmese government, but its strategic interests are paramount.
India's force modernization is directed towards making India
the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, as well as a major
stabilizing force in the Southeast Asian region. According to
the integrated Defense Perspective Plan the ultimate goal is
for the Indian armed forces to have the capability to sustain
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a war on two f ronts--Pakistan and China--without any external
military or diplomatic dependence. 110
Along these lines, strong Chinese and Pakistani influence
in Burma is seen as a direct threat to Indian security. It is
probable that India regards the Chinese economic penetration
of Upper Burma with considerable alarm, both as a potential
omen of overly strong Chinese political or even military-
interests in Southeast Asia and as an economic flanking
movement on India's eastern front. China's potential
influence in Burma also undercuts India's perception of its
own regional role and potential as a power. Should China gain
access to the Andaman Sea New dehli could feel threatened.
How the Indian administration will respond to Burma's ongoing
military buildup remains unclear.
Finally, in the past few years, the quantity of opium and
heroin crossing into India has increased markedly. Most of
the drugs are bound for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East;
however, the amount that falls though the cracks, remaining in
India, has the addiction population sky rocketing and the
authorities worried. The permeable borders between them make
interdiction almost impossible, while the Indian Ocean ports
allow for easy access to the rest of the world.
11 Indian Political Journal
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D. JAPAN: PERSONAL TIES MAY NOT LAST
A unique relationship exists with Japan which seems to be
based more on irrational emotions rather than sound
principles. In the 1930 's Tokyo was instrumental in fostering
an independence movement against Great Britain. The Thirty
Comrades --among which was Ne Win- -trained in Japan and
participated in the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1941.
Although the nationalists later turned against the Japanese,
many have maintained close personal ties with Tokyo. These
relationships have helped to foster the close economic bonds
between the two countries.
Japan has been Burma's primary donor since the mid-50 's.
In 1986 Japanese aid peaked at U.S. $244 million, or 6.3% of
all Japanese foreign assistance. 111 This tremendous volume
of aid was responsible for keeping the Burmese economy afloat
throughout the 'Burmese Way Toward Socialism' era. Without
the aid from Japan Burma's inefficient state-run system would
have collapsed. Tokyo informed Rangoon, in March 1988, that
unless reforms were initiated the aid would be terminated.
September's repression saved Tokyo from making any hard
decisions
.
Without aid, or any source of hard currency, the SLORC
was soon deeply behind in repayments. By 1989 Burma had over
U.S. $5. 3 billion in foreign debt--and interest accruing at a
Lintner, Bertil, "The Odd Couple", The Far Eastern
Economic Reviev (11 July 1991) 39.
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rate of over U.S. $8 million a month. 11 - Then, unexpectedly,
Japan recognized the SLORC and partially restored aid by
helping to restructure some of Rangoon's outstanding debt.
Although no new aid was given the move did relieve some of the
pressure; it also gave the regime a small degree of legitimacy
in the international arena.
The old personal relationships should not be overshadowed
by these actions, however. Sound financial principles are
pushing the old sentiments aside. The emotional alliances are
becoming a thing of the past as more post-war leaders--in both
countries--come into power. The Japanese--apart from the
leadership--are beginning to realize that the SLORC cannot
continue on its present path much longer; if relations are
going to continue they will have to be based on rational
decisions, unlike the past.
E. ASEAN: TIME TO TAKE A STAND
So far the ASEAN states have refused to condemn the
Burmese Government for its severe human rights violations.
For the most part, they have continued their political and
economic relations based on the premise that only positive
engagement will persuade the regime to change its
policies. 113 The ASEAN charter contains a provision for the
112 IBID.
113 Muthiah Alagappa, "Confronting the SLORC", Far Eastern
Economic Review (28 November 1991) 28.
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management of regional peace, security and stability among its
members. This is to be accomplished according to "certain
prescribed, universally-valid principles, namely mutual
respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
the right of every state to lead its national existence free
from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-
interference in the internal affairs of one another;
settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
renunciation of the threat of force or the use of force; and
effective cooperation among members." 114 While Burma is not
a member of ASEAN, the organization has extended these
principles to include all sovereign nations, especially those
within the region.
Recent pressure has been applied to ASEAN by Western
governments, primarily the U.S. Government, to push the SLORC
toward reform. It has been suggested that ASEAN needs to
communicate to the SLORC, that if the repression continues,
the association would be forced to take collective political
action, including a political and economic embargo. ' If
ASEAN is sincere about its desires to assume a leadership role
3 Jawhar Hassan, "ASEAN as a Factor for Peace, Security,
Stability and Cooperation in Southeast Asia", Myanma r and the
Wider Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and
International Studies, 1991) 4.
115 Alagappa, "Confronting the SLORC", 2
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in Southeast Asia, it must act now to help resolve the unrest
in Burma, in spite of its charter.
F. OTHER REGIONAL INTERESTS
A number of other regional nations have been active in
Burma in recent years, despite the existence of an economic
embargo. Pakistan has been supplying arms to the Burmese
military—whether on credit or for cash is not known.
Sufficient numbers of Pakistani arms have been captured by the
Karen insurgents to indicate that they are an important
supplier to the Burmese military.
Bangladesh has also figured into the new economic and
political relations with Burma. The two countries entered
into a new $20 million counter-trade agreement on 1 June 1989,
to encourage the legal expansion of economic relations, 111, in
spite of border tensions. In 1978 Muslims fled in large
numbers to Bangladesh to avoid the wrath of the Burmese
military. The military claimed they were conducting a routine
sweep for illegal immigrants, forcing nearly 200,000 to move
to the neighboring country--many of whom were able to show
proof of Burmese citizenship. Those in the refugee camps
along the border told of killings, rape, and arson committed
by the Burmese military. 117 The most recent campaign
116 IBID.
Lintner, Bertil, "Diversionary Tactics", Far Eastern
Economic Review (29 August 1991) 26.
105
seems to have begun two years ago, when the SLORC started
moving people into new satellite towns to effect more control
over the population. Thousands of Muslims were resettled at
sites that lacked sanitation, safe drinking water, and other
basic facilities after the army had moved in and razed their
villages. Border refugee camps estimate over 16,000 displaced
muslims now live in the camps with thousands more likely to
come after the rainy season--end of December.
South Korea has moved rapidly into Burma with the signing
of the first oil exploration contract, and its role is likely
to grow. There have also been reports of South Korean arms
shipments to Burmalu --Seoul has been taking advantage of the
lack of foreign investment to obtain favorable terms. In the
past few months South Korean firms have signed two, multi-
million dollar joint ventures with Burma, one for producing
textiles, and a second will process timber for plywood and
other wood products.
Malaysian and Singapore firms have established joint
ventures with the Burmese, and there have been additional
reports of Singapore arms shipments to the Burmese
military. 119 On 5 March 1990, the Chief of the General Staff
of the Singapore military paid a visit to Burma at the




also probable that Taiwanese firms have moved investments into
Burma through the overseas Chinese communities in Thailand,
Singapore, and Malaysia. 120
Other countries which are reportedly shipping arms to the
Burmese military include; Yugoslavia, Poland, and indirectly
Sweden and Japan, with dual use items (such as patrol boats
with deck plating for gun mounts), and by re-export of their
products by other countries. 121 The longer these countries
are allowed to sell arms to Burma's brutal military regime,
the longer the SLORC will have the power to stay in business.
This will make it all-the-more difficult to begin meaningful
rural development programs, and, ultimately, a successful
counter-narcotics programs.
Steinburg, David, "International Rivalries in Burma",
Asian Survey
, VOL. XXX, NO. 6 (June 1990) 59 9.
121 IBID.
107
IX. PAST U.S. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY
The Department of State provides anti-narcotics
assistance to foreign governments, under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, to reduce the flow of dangerous drugs
into the United States. Initially, the State Department
provided Burma primarily helicopters and transport aircraft.
In 1985, the U.S. began providing spray planes and herbicide
for the aerial eradication of opium poppies. 1 " In September
of 1988, the United States suspended the funding for the anti-
narcotics assistance program, as well as other programs, after




Western narcotics officials say opium production in the
Golden Triangle, which includes areas of Thailand, Burma, and
Laos, has doubled since the 1987-88 harvesting season when it
reached 1,200 metric tons. In 1988-89, a bumper crop of 2,400
tons was harvested in the Golden Triangle. This year was
another record-breaking crop, exceeding last year's mark by
Committee on Foreign Affairs: House of
Representatives, "U.S. Narcotics Control Efforts in Southeast
Asia" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
100th congress, 1st session, 30 June and 15 July 1987), 53-71.
Subcommittees on Human Rights and International
Organizations, "The Crackdown in Burma: Suppression of the
Democracy Movement and Violations of Human Rights"
(Washington, D.C.: 101st Congress, 1st session, Sept. 13,
1989) 54-72.
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several hundred metric tonnes. 1 - In early 1987, John Lawn,
director of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) ,
called for "no mercy" in the U.S. war on drugs. He urged the
governments of Southeast Asia's opium growing region to be
more willing to take on hostile poppy growers in armed
confrontations. On 30 January 1987, Bangkok's Nation
newspaper featured a photograph of then U.S. ambassador to
Bangkok William Brown handing a U.S. $1.8 million check to a
smiling official from Thailand's Office of Narcotics Control
Board. 1 "
Shortly afterwards, the Bangkok media reported that
Burmese Government forces had attacked the headquarters of
opium warlord, Khun Sa in his Burmese stronghold, located just
across the border from Thailand's Mae Hong Son providence.
Casualties were high, the newspapers reported, and Burma had
agreed to allow Thai troops to enter Burma in "hot pursuit of
drug overlord Khun Sa." 1J '- By mid-March, the Thai military
authorities declared that the anti-Khun Sa drive had been a
success
.
In April, however, a foreign visiter to Khun Sa ' s Homong
headquarters was astonished to find no damage to the camp.
Asked about the recent fighting, the warlord laughed and said:
124 Richardson, 17.
Bertil Lintner, "A Fix in the Making", Far East
Economic Review (28 June 1990), 20.
126 IBID., 21.
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"Oh that. That was a newspaper war." 127 Since then, the
United States attitudes have hardened and a more critical mood
has been focused on Thailand; most notably at hearings on
narcotics in Washington on March 9, 1990, Melvin Levitsky,
assistant secretary of state for narcotics matters, said: "The
problem in Thailand now is ...increasing reports of
corruption ... It is very clear that, particularly along the
Burma border, there is collusion between some high-level and
some low-level Thai officials and the traffickers."""
A. CIA INVOLVEMENT
It has yet to be proven the CIA directly involved itself
in the drug traffic to finance its operations; though the
evidence is very convincing of its connivance. The CIA's role
in the heroin traffic was an inadvertent, but almost
inevitable consequence of its cold war tactics. Since 1970,
failure of DEA suppression efforts combined with CIA
complicity in global narcotics trafficking allowed world opium
production to multiply fourfold to 4200 metric tonnes in 1989.
Of that total, 73% came from Southeast Asia, where for a
quarter-century the CIA had worked closely with the region's
drug lords. 129







U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in the past have had mixed
results in part because of ambiguous signals and varying
national security priorities. The need for intelligence has
often superseded the efforts in counter-narcotics.
Information obtained by one agency may not be available to
others, regardless of the value of that information to those
agencies. The CIA is one case in point; the agency is ultra-
secretive and very protective of its sources, often
overlooking their underworld connections. As pointed out
earlier, information would have been difficult to garner
without the assistance of the KMT. Attempts by DEA agents to
move against remnants of the KMT and other druglords have been




The indictment of Khun Sa on drug charges by a U.S. court
in December 1989 reflects the growing concern in the U.S. over
this dilemma, and the fact that Washington has, for too long,
placed official complicity in the drug trade belov; security
considerations. Narcotics officials in Southeast Asia are
becoming increasingly concerned about what seems to be
official connivance in the drug trade.
It would be impossible to move such vast quantities of
narcotics without such collusion. Smugglers of jade, precious
130 Interview with Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) operative
in January 1991. His name has been withheld at his request.
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stones, and consumer goods pay their bribes to Burmese army
and police officials; it is surmised heroin smugglers utilize
the very same contacts. The official Burmese government
stance is a hard-line against the industry. To prove their
point, the Rangoon government refute the Western estimates of
its opium production. The official Working People's Daily of
11 March said : "According to 1990 statistics, the tonnage
produced [in Burma] would be around 280 metric tonnes" or, in
other words, only 14% of Western estimates. 131
Enforcement efforts by the Burmese government have had
little effect on narcotics trafficking. From 1984 to 1987,
the Burmese Army and police annually seized an average of
about 1.5 metric tons of opium--less than 1% of total annual
yield, and destroyed about five refineries. These actions did
little to reduce Burmese opium trafficking.
Charles B. Rangel, chairman of the select committee on
narcotics abuse and control in the U.S. House of
Representatives, said that Congress is "concerned about the
explosion of opium and heroin that has been redistributed
through Thailand"
. He acknowledged that Thailand has sharply
reduced drug production within its own borders, leaving Burma
131
"Officials Destroy $190 Million Worth of Drugs", FBIS
EAS-91-128 (3 July 1991) 42.
132 IBID.
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and Laos as the major sources of Southeast Asian opium."
However, Thailand is still a key link for the heroin industry
to the Western markets. Southeast Asian drug barons, are
using their huge profits from the sale of narcotics to buy
advanced weapons and bribe officials; they have access to
equipment and money which many police and drug enforcement
agencies cannot match. Where the interdiction agencies must
work within fixed budgets and relatively slow procurement
procedures, smugglers can acquire personnel and state-of-the-
art equipment as rapidly as the market permits. Well
organized and powerful drug cartels continue to increase
profits by developing new markets. World-wide traffic in
drugs is now second only to that in armaments. 134
Cooperative efforts by the Thai and U.S. drug enforcement
agencies have produced limited results. During the six month
period ending March 1990, roughly 300 kilograms of heroin were
seized--an amount approximately l/8th of 1% of the year's
production. 1 European drug enforcement agencies have also
seen limited results for their efforts, with 1.75 metric
Richardson, 17 .
134 Margaret J. Anstee, "A World War Against Drug Abuse",
U.N. Chronicle (March 1990), 83.
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tonnes--1986 was a record year for heroin seizures in Western
Europe. 136
Asia has become more attractive to money launderers . In
many Asian countries money laundering is legal. It is
attractive to governments because it allows them to quickly
build their banking systems, which in turn helps their
economies. Financial considerations add to historical apathy
and a lack of cooperation with the West on legal matters such
as drug trafficking. 13 ' Burma has now opened its doors to
money launderers; offering a one time "tax amnesty" --no
questions asked--the SLORC has attracted funds from drug
traffickers
.
"We must face up to the fact that we are losing, not
winning, the war against heroin in Southeast Asia", said
Daniel A. O'Donohue, the U.S. ambassador to Thailand, in a
speech December 1987. 1; A new approach must be taken.
If headway is to be made in the war on drugs, the future
U.S. counter-narcotics policy must address the issues which
have been discussed in this thesis. However, before that
policy can be formulated, the U.S. must contemplate the future
of Burma; more specifically, what impact will current policy
International Narcotics Board Report, "Drugs Destroy
Say No!", U.N. Chronicle (June 1988), 71.









SLORC HANGS ON TO POWER
This chapter will attempt to forecast the most probable
direction the SLORC will proceed in the foreseeable future. It
will also try to anticipate the reaction of the people
currently living in state of terror, under this repressive
military rule. Steps, which are sorely needed for Burma to
climb from the depths of its deteriorated state, will also be
discussed, as will the probability of reforms actually being
implemented.
If development is to improve rather than exacerbate
internal security problems, and also provide a domestic
situation stable enough to furnish a basis for defense against
external threats, development planning and policy must
emphasize strategies aimed at improving social justice as well
as economic growth. It needs to be recognized that
development will only improve internal security in the long
term if it helps to equalize differentials in wealth between
regions, ethnic groups and classes.
The lack of experienced policy makers within the
government structure, as well as its refusal to heed external
advice, has meant that the SLORC does not possess the
intelligence or the wisdom required to conceive the tough
economic decisions needed to turn the failing economy around.
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For instance, the overvalued exchange rate is one of the main
obstacles to reducing inflation, and increasing production and
foreign investment. Instead of devaluing the Kyat, the SLORC
has simply printed more currency to cover its exorbitant
expenses .
A. SIX STEPS TOWARD PROGRESS
Leading Burma specialists have attempted assess the
future of Burma and set guide-lines for development and
measures needed to initiate productive change--if Burma is to
have any future at all. Josef Silverstein suggests that Burma
has six major hurdles to face in the 1990's. These include:
(1) the transfer of power to an elected civilian government;
(2) the peaceful settlement of the civil war; (3) drafting and
accepting a new constitution which does not repeat the
mistakes of the past; (4) the formulation of an economic and
development policy; (5) rebuilding society and the educational
system; (6) finally, ending opium production
.
1JL Each of the
identified challenges deserve a brief discussion, as does
their potential for success.
Josef Silverstein, "Myanmar's (Burma's) Six Domestic
Challenges in the 1990's", Myanmar and the Wider Southeast
Asia
, ed. Rohana Mahmood and Hans-Joachim Esderts (Kuala
Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies
(ISIS) Malaysia, 1991) 11-22.
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1. Transfer of Power
It is highly unlikely the SLORC would be amenable
to a transfer of power within the next five years--for
all the reasons previously mentioned. The elections of
May 1990 indicated, with little doubt, the majority of
the people are anti-SLORC; they are tired of the inept,
unqualified government they have been forced to endure
for over three decades. There can be no meaningful
discussion of Burma's future until the military accepts
the will of the people and transfers power to the
rightful leaders. If a transfer of power is to take
place, however, it will not be executed voluntary.
Unless rocked by a cataclysm which incites its
people to rise up against the SLORC, Burma will remain
under the heavy hand of its military rulers for the
foreseeable future. There are two likely incidents
which, if they occur, have the potential to unseat the
SLORC, or worse, throw the country back into a violent
struggle for its survival. The first likely event to
occur is the death of Ne Win; this option has the most
potential to become violent, as his successors struggle
for control. This situation is similar to that in
China; many are simply waiting for their leader, Deng
Xiaoping, to pass away before initiating further reforms
or making a play for power.
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The most likely heir to Ne Win's throne is Major
General Khin Nyunt, head of the infamous DDSI and
reputed to be the most powerful member of the SLORC.
His secret police and spy network are on a par with
those of the past governments of Romania and East
Germany. He has no altruistic plans for the future of
Burma save his own continued rise to riches and power.
Khin Nyunt is already reputed to be one of the richest
men in Burma with hundreds of millions of dollars from
bribes, black market operations, and narcotics
trafficking allegedly stashed in Swiss banks. If he is
successful in replacing Ne Win, the rein of terror will
continue and Myanmar will slide deeper into its abyss.
Another spark which would ignite a renewed outbreak of
anti-government violence would be the untimely death of
imprisoned opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The
recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, the Sakarov
Prize, and the RAFTO Peace Prize has been imprisoned
under strict house arrest by the SLORC for almost two
and one-half years, and is revered by the people. Her
enormous popularity is rooted in her heritage--her
father, Aung San is worshipped by the Burmese. But it
was her compassion and ability to articulate the
frustrations felt throughout Burma that propelled her to
the forefront of the opposition party, the NLD
.
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The government arrested her as a threat to the
security of the state. Upon accepting the award for
his mother, her son eloquently described her role in
shaping Burma's future, "...by her own dedication and
personal sacrifice she has come to be a worthy symbol
through whom the plight of all the people of Burma may
be recognized." 140 She has addressed the plight of
minorities and is anxious to negotiate a settlement to
end the civil war. She recognizes the flaws within the
government, the poor state of the economy and the
needed reforms required to initiate an extensive
reconstruction program. Aung San Suu Kyi has done her
homework; she has spent her life carrying on in her
father's footsteps, not for personal gain, but for her
people. If any single individual has the charisma to
unite Burma under a single banner, it is she.
Should harm come to her while she is confined, it
is believed the people will rise up against the
government, possibly causing its demise. If, however,
she is freed and allowed to implement the democratic
changes she has proposed, Burma's future could turn
around almost over night. She has the educational
background and the wisdom to make the needed reforms;
John Tagliabue, "Son Picks Up Nobel Prize For an
Unfree Burmese Dissenter", The New York Times (11 December
19 91) A7.
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she also possesses exposure to the outside world that
allows her insight the current regime lacks.
2. Ending the Civil War
A peaceful settlement to the civil war--the second
challenge to the Burmese to overcome--is as unlikely as
a transfer of power. There are many causes for the
war. Promises that were made--and later broken--at
Panglong included political equality, the right to
preserve and protect traditional cultures and languages
and to enjoy a wide range of autonomous government in
their own areas. However, one after another, the
minorities found their lands invaded, their people
violated and their territory under military rule.
Unequal treatment in national development plans, the
concentration of educational centers and the location of
new industries in Burman-dominated areas all contributed
to a breakdown of trust and provoked war. Even the army,
which under the British was organized on the basis of
race, was Burmanised after 1949, and few, if any, of the
minorities were able to rise to high positions. 141
From the outset the army has seen the minorities as
destroyers of the union, because many in revolt were, at
times, allied with the now defunct CPB. The military saw
141 Interview with retired Burmese army officer, Mr. Edgar
Gaudoin, in December 1991.
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them as enemies of the state and sought to defeat them
and then to integrate their territory into a unified
state, rather than trying to understand their complaints
and responding to them.
It may seem contradictory that, with peace
restored to several former war zones in the frontier
regions, the SLORC should be rapidly increasing the
strength of its armed forces. But these developments
are consistent with Rangoon's previous strategies: a
strong army, freed from counter-insurgency duties in
the frontier areas, is needed to preserve the
military's supremacy in the central Burman heartland.
The civil war will continue despite the military build-
up; the grievances of the opposition parties will not
dissolve under threat of, or use, of force; development
cannot take place while the war continues. Negotiations
to resolve the internal differences can proceed only in
a non-hostile atmosphere. Only when the war really ends
can the nation take the next step and begin the process
of writing a new constitution, the third obstacle to
overcome
.
3. Writing a New, Improved Constitution
The difficulty in writing a new constitution lays
in defining the issues which have divided the nation
since independence, and in finding solutions so that
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the political process and not war will be the solution
to future problems in Burma. Three major issues which
need to be resolved are the division of political
power, property and taxation rights, and police and
defence powers. This process will indeed take some
time, but that alone should not be used by the military
as an excuse to hold on to power during the period of
deliberation
.
While the SLORC stalls the process of writing a
new constitution, it has not slowed its drive to
subjugate all rivals. The National League for
Democracy, Burma's main opposition party, which swept
the polls in May 1990, is a mere shell of its former
self. Since the election, much of its leadership has
been detained, arrested, or picked up for
interrogation— including torture--while its membership,
along with the population have been cowed into
submission by the military. Most other pro-democracy
movements have shared the same fate and have, for all
intents and purposes, collapsed. Opposition to the
government has ceased to exist--at least on the
surface. The government has unmercifully crushed all
dissent in the urban areas, and is keeping the lid on
with large contingents of troops stationed within the
cities. The military also has the manpower available to
step up its attacks on the more troublesome insurgencies-
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-as it has in the past year--keeping them at bay while it
sells the county's resources to all comers. While these
practices are detrimental to the growth and stability of
Burma, this strategy is most likely going to continue
while the SLORC searches for the means to maintain its
viability. Therefore, continued repression of the people
will probably continue--allegedly for the sake of
stability, and the good of the nation.
4. Implementation of Economic Reforms
The fourth hurdle for Burma to maneuver is the
economic development policy for future growth. To
surmount the internal instability created by the civil
war and economic decay the government must introduce
reforms and make concessions along the very lines
demanded by the various discontented groups. In this
case, compromise, would appear to be a preferable
alternative for Burma rather than its continued decay
and probable collapse.
Shortly after assuming power in 1988, the SLORC
announced economic reforms which, it promised, would
launch the country into recovery. Initially, these
reforms had an impact on foreign investors interested in
a share of Burma's potential growth and development.
After the initial fervor, international enthusiasm waned,
not yet convinced of the SLORC's sincerity, or its
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ability to provide a stable environment for investments.
Confidence in the new regime is lacking despite the
leadership's ambitious development plans and the relative
calm--inspired by fear--the military has brought to the
land. Most of the approved projects have yet to gain
momentum owing to this uncertainty; although, they have
been highly publicized in an attempt to add a measure of
legitimacy to Rangoon's government. Additionally, the
reforms initiated by the SLORC have been politically
motivated and are founded on less than sound economic
principles
.
Few investments from external sources have
progressed beyond the planning stages; most of those
that have made headway have exploited the vast resource
wealth of the country. Petroleum exploration has
funded a significant share of the growth and
modernization of the military; the lavish signature
bonuses, allowed the military to purchase the hardware
it required to stay in power. A large portion of
potential future proceeds have been mortgaged to pay
the balance of its newly acquired debt. The SLORC
seems to be gambling its entire future on new oil
discoveries. According to most sources, prospects for
finding significant reserves look good. Although
actual production may still be several years away, the
government has been able to profit in the short-term by
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mortgaging some of the potential long-term production.
If the reserves are proven, and production begins
within a short period, the SLORC will have the
financial support it needs to stay in power for the
foreseeable future. The looming question is: will the
SLORC have the means to continue its modernization
program until the new oil reserves are found? The teak
and fisheries concessions given to Thai and Chinese
business ventures are being exploited as quickly as
possible, taking advantage of bargain prices and the
prevailing dire straits of the regime. The 'economic
partnerships' are not permanent or intended to be
enduring for any of the actors involved. The SLORC
simply needs hard currency to stay in power; it does
not care where the cash comes from. While the sources
of the hard currency care little for the destruction
and hardships they cause within Burma by their actions-
-whether directly or indirectly.
The current state of economic affairs is bleak;
many deep-seated problems endure that must be resolved
before recovery can be initiated. The country's civil
war and ethnic insurgencies still thrive, as does the
opium trade, while the military refuses to relinquish
its choke-hold on the people (still believing the
military is the solution and not the problem) .
Formulating a solution to Burma's economic woes is made
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difficult because so many of Burma's problems are
inter-related; possible solutions are complex, and
warrant addressing other problem areas as well.
The very depressing state of the economy has been
studied by various specialists who suggest that,
although excessively ill, Burma's economic forecast is
not necessarily hopeless. U Tun Wai, a veteran
International Monetary Fund (IMF) official and
international economic consultant, singles out
government mismanagement of the economy as the
fundamental reason for the failure of the economy. In
general, he points to the investment and savings policy,
fiscal policy, the management of the SEE, monetary and
pricing policy, and balance of payments and exchange
policy in particular. He further suggests that his
systematic "stocktaking" of the strengths and weaknesses
of the economy may be used as a basis for prescribing a
pragmatic framework for medium-term economic programming
in the next three to four years."'
Myat Thein, a resident economist in Rangoon,
explains his belief that the financial sector in Burma
today is less developed than the one which existed in
1963, before nationalization, and the fiscal deficits
142 Mya Than and Joseph L.H. Tan, "Optimism for Myanmar's
Economic Transition in the 1990s?", Myanmar Dilemmas and
Options (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1990) 9.
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have been largely to blame for the twin problems of
internal and external imbalances. He feels that the
over-extension of the public sector, particularly to
the SEEs, is responsible for the fiscal deficits. He
proposes a "supply-leading" type of financial
development as the single most important aspect of
monetary policy development in the 1990s. 143
Several other economists suggest that improper
agricultural marketing policies, in particular the
pricing policy, was one of the key problems which
dragged the economy into collapse. They found that
Burmese farmers were responsive to marketing policy and
prices, and the government's interventions in the
agricultural sector seemed to hinder its development.
This finding is bolstered by a study by Tin Soe and
Brian S. Fisher, who studied the development in rice
price policies and their impact on production,
procurement, and export and the domestic use of rice in
Burma during the period 1948-87. Their research
unambiguously showed that rice policies prior to 1961/62
contributed to growth of the agricultural sector, while
those adopted after 1962/63 had serious consequences for




Other leading Burmese economists point out the
primacy of politics over the economy, a weak
administration, consequences of the nationalization of
all trade, industry, banking and education sectors,
unviable and inefficient state enterprises, over-valued
currency, inflation and the black market, as well as
restrictive trade and unrealistic pricing policies as
the contributing factors for the failure of ' ).
economy. Soe Saing, a former Ministry of Finance and
Revenue official, also recommends that in order to
overcome the impediments to economic recovery, it is
essential to substantially increase external technical
aid first before obtaining large capital
infusions. 14 ' By doing so Burma will have the
expertise available to put these development funds to
better use. A likely candidate with the ability to
furnish that kind of assistance is the United Nations.
In addition to technical assistance, other changes
are needed before Burma will be able to increase its
domestic savings rate, and attract much needed foreign
investment capital. These include fundamental
political and bureaucratic changes as well as
significant improvement in the social,




which are so important to the economic development and
are so lacking within Burma. With no easy, clear-cut
path to follow, a key starting point would be to address
the political instability of the country, or, more to the
point, the SLORC should turn power over to the duly
elected government, and help to ensure a smooth
transition
.
5. Regaining Lost Societal Values
The fifth area of concern is rebuilding the society
and educational system. Throughout the three decades of
military rule there has been a deterioration of values
and a broad corruption of the people. 146. The
government was unable to provide the necessities of life-
-food, clothing, and medicine--while the socialist market
place could not provide employment to youth entering the
job market. The blackmarket was able to provide these
products and services and the people were forced to make
use of it to survive. In the process the values of the
Burmese people were undermined as they turned toward
illegal trade, smuggling and graft to support their
families. With economic reforms the blackmarket will
become far less important as it is replaced by a
functioning legitimate economy. New laws must also
Josef Silverstein, "Myanmar's Six Domestic
Challenges", 19.
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accompany these reforms to ensure all are treated
equally, regardless of rank or position.
Despite past efforts to curb its success, the
black market survives as an integral component in
Burma's economic system. The black market continues to
service the country better than the government could
possibly hope to, under the current conditions. The
SLORC acknowledges the market's success and has made no
attempts to suppress the trade, lest it face renewed
popular wrath--due to the lack of a suitable
alternative to the blackmarket
.
Besides serving as a conduit for consumer goods
and many other hard-to-get items--which are available
only outside the official government sources--many
government and military officials use the black market
as an additional source of income. To impose a
crackdown would also mean facing opposition among those
empowered to enforce the action. As is often the case
with taking the path of least resistance, this is not
the most beneficial course of action for the economy in
the long run. The policy is, however, in keeping with
the inept handling of the economy by military leaders
during the past three decades; therefore, it will
invariably remain as an essential non-action policy of
the SLORC.
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The sporadic closing of schools and universities is
another problem which undercuts values and jeopardizes
Burma's growth. The greatest potential threat seen by
Rangoon remains the disgruntled students. The nation's
youth have historically been able to turn mass opinion
quickly by staging demonstrations which echo the
complaints of the rank and file. In September 1988, the
demonstrators were able to turn even some of the
military, which had been sent in to quell the unrest .
Major General Khin Nyunt , has vowed to initiate
appropriate action against those causing unrest, or
disturbances at universities or other public
places. :; In September 1988 "appropriate action" was
taken when soldiers opened fire on unarmed demonstrators;
thousands of students--as well as innocent bystanders-
were massacred in Rangoon. In the past month, students
again have taken to the streets to protest the
incarceration of Aung San Suu Kyi; again the troops have
opened fire on them killing untold numbers. It is
certain the military will resort to the same tactics to
quell student protests in the future. The military has
manipulated the institutions to curb free speech and
student demands. Again, they have ignored the issues at
hand and have dealt with the situation by force rather
:i FBIS, "AFP: Junta Remains Fearful of Student Unrest",
FBIS-EAS-91-065-A (4 April 1991) 29.
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than diplomacy and negotiation. This strategy undercuts
the foundations of the educational system and deprives
the nation of its greatest resource.
An important obstacle to the implementation of the
required political and economic reforms lies in the
dominant political role of the armed forces. Why
should the military leadership agree to restrain
military expenditures and back fundamental economic,
social and political reforms--in other words,
voluntarily forgo some of the most important benefits of
power? There are no easy solutions to this dilemma. The
military has enjoyed increased pay and benefits to the
detriment of the rest of society, which reinforces their
position as the privileged elite. In fact, the armed
forces believe they alone have the intelligence and skill
required to nurture and guide Burma back to health--a
misconception they have maintained since before gaining
independence. They have been able to maintain their
power by selling-off the country's natural resources to
buy the weapons needed to carry out their repressive
policies. As long as they are able to keep the
opposition forces divided the SLORC will remain in power.
With this in mind; what is the future outlook for
Burma? Will the SLORC persist in its singular crusade
to stamp out all opposition? Or, will growing domestic
and international pressure force a peaceful transition
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of power to the duly elected democratic government?
Clearly, the SLORC's recent moves to strengthen the
military indicate it is pushing in favor of the former
option. As indicated earlier, it has intensified its
efforts to rout the insurgents. The government is
comfortable with this strategy, it seems to be the only
one they know, or are willing to use. The frail
alliances Rangoon has fashioned with former insurgents
and traffickers will last as long as both sides of the
agreements are content with their personal gains, and no
faction gains too much power within a given area.
Revisions are lacking in Rangoon's policies which
do not allow for meaningful dialogue to with the ethnic
minorities. The government cannot win an internal
civil war in which it has for years leveled villages to
prevent them from providing aid to rebel forces. Some
of the demands of the insurgents are very rational and
merit discussion between them.
A reversal of the routine brutal repression and
human rights violations is mandatory for progress to be
made in finding a solution to the civil war. The SLORC
views "all is fair..." when it comes to its task of
"deterring violence in the country, protecting the
state from disintegration and thwarting all bids to
retard progress in fulfilling the aspirations of the
masses". They feel their efforts in this struggle
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"have nothing to do with human rights.-' The
government must realize that it cannot continue to rule
from the barrel of a gun.
Finally, Burma's leadership has to come to terms
with its inability to manage the country's economy. I*
must seek assistance from its educated class--although
most are living in exile abroad--or from the
industrialized nations of the world, or other outside
organizations which have the expertise available. It
must grant some degree of regional autonomy to the
ethnic minorities in an effort to overcome the
impediments to peace. Without these changes the SLORC
is doomed to continue its rule under arms over an
increasingly discontented and hostile populace. The
opium industry will continue to thrive until the ruling
party separates the complexities of the insurgencies
from the intricacies of the opium trade. The
insurgencies will continue to flourish, feeding off the
growing discontent of the people.
6. Eradication of Opium
The sixth challenge is purging the country of the
opium industry and all associated activities. The
148
"SLORC's ' Nation Building Role Discussed", Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-EAS-91-092 , 13 May 1991,
30.
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industry has served a very few individuals very well
for decades; it has also contributed significantly to
the country's decay. Opposition groups have pledged
that when the civil war ends, they will work towards
eradication of opium production--as long as a viable
alternative exists.
The United Nations has pledged to contribute funds
for border development programs in Burma which will
yield alternative sources of income for the inhabitants
of the growing regions, and infrastructure projects
which substantially improve the quality of live in
those regions.
The remaining catch is, of course, the civil war
still rages on with no indication of a break in the
fighting, the SLORC refuses to relinquish power, and
the brutal repression continues. Until the SLORC is
able to come to terms with its opponents through
negotiations the sixth challenge is insurmountable.
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X. CONCLUSION: U.S. Policy in Burma
A. COUNTER-NARCOTICS
In 1979, the State Department reported that the social,
economic, and political realities of drug-growing countries
make it difficult to prevent cultivation of illicit crops and
stop trafficking at the sources. 149 The report noted that
most producing nations present problems that are too complex
for a predominantly law enforcement approach to be effective
in reducing drug supplies. The results of our program in
Burma demonstrate the continued validity of this conclusion.
The largest and most complex problem in Burma is the
ongoing conflict between the central government and the
various ethnic populations. The lack of government control of
the border regions has helped trafficking organizations to
flourish, and insurgent groups have become increasingly more
involved in narcotics trafficking to finance their activities.
It is possible that the political motives of some insurgents
may eventually dissipate--as happened with the Nationalist
Chinese, and more recently, with the breakup of the CPB--
leaving Burma with additional well-armed, battle-hardened
149
"Gains Made in Controlling Illegal Drugs: Yet the Drug
Trade Flourishes", GGD-80-4 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, Oct. 25, 1979), 4-8.
137
opium gangs. ' Therefore, it appears that the longer the
insurgencies continue, the more intractable Burma's opium
problem is likely to become.
Ongoing insurgencies help to further entrench narcotics
trafficking in Burma; they also complicate Burma's severe
economic problems which help foster opium production and make
narcotics-related operations difficult to combat. The
insurgencies consume government resources needed for economic
revitalization and discourage outside investment that could
provide Burmese farmers with alternatives to opium
cultivation. After 40 years of fighting, there is little
indication that the insurgencies can be resolved militarily.
Therefore, a political settlement with the insurgents is
needed before long-term narcotics reductions can be achieved.
Negotiations with the insurgents appear to be a needed
step, although a settlement alone cannot be expected to
immediately "solve" the opium problem in Burma. First of all,
well-armed, profit-oriented groups would remain and, after a
political settlement, some insurgents who have gained
experience in the drug trade might join them or compete
against them. Secondly, the lack of transportation
infrastructure will remain a major impediment to the
introduction of alternative crops in much of the growing
region. As the State Department reported in 1979, rural
u
'° Bertil Lintner, "The Rise and Fall of the Communists",
27-29.
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development sufficient to shift farmers away from opium
production requires many skills, expertise, and money; if it
is ever successful, success will only come after years or
decades. However, a political settlement may help foster the
cooperative relationship between the central government and
the ethnic populations that would be needed to address these
problems
.
Effective action against narcotics must combine
eradication and enforcement against criminal trafficking with
economic assistance and political stability. Eradication
programs alone will not produce long-term sustainable
narcotics reductions, and any successes are likely to be
temporary unless actions are taken to provide growers with an
alternative source of income.
1. Khun Sa's Offer
An alternative approach has been proposed by drug
lord Khun Sa, who for years has suggested the United
States simply buy his entire production, thereby
removing it from the market. His plan carries with it
a US$300 million price tag, to be paid over a six year
period. The offer also requires assistance in crop
substitution and border development, similar to the
current United Nations proposal. 151
151 Hodding Carter IV, 86-90
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The proposition is not unique; the U.S. has a
history of buying out poppy crops. In the early 1970 's,
the U.S. paid $35.7 million to buy out Turkish poppy
farmers at a time when 80% of /America's heroin came from
Turkey. In the Golden Triangle, in 1972, the U.S. bought
26 tons of opium for $1 million from General Li, an ex-
Kuomintang officer who was the most powerful drug lord at
the time. 152
The U.S. government has so far declined Khun Sa '
s
offer, instead, indicting Khun Sa on trafficking and
racketeering charges. It would be very difficult for
the government to accept his offer because he does not
represent the majority of the Shan people, not to
mention the other minorities of the growing region.
His dominance of the industry is slipping; he now
shares control with several competing warlords. His
plea falls short of a sincere request for development
assistance
.
152 Alfred McCoy, 73
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2. Crop Substitution
U.S. officials have noted that in Thailand, decades
of rural development in the opium growing regions,
combined with crop substitution programs, poppy
eradication, and other enforcement efforts, resulted in
the elimination of almost 90% of the opium crop in the
past 10 years. Much of the success of the Thai program
is attributed to economic assistance from international
donors, and a desire by the central government to improve
relations with the ethnic minorities involved in
Thailand's opium cultivation. 15 '
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO) , a primary factor to
consider in planning a drug crop substitution program
is: how will the farmer view it? The farmer is likely
to be most concerned about the existence of alternative
on-farm or off-farm activities that will pay at least as
much as poppy cultivation, and whether the economic
uncertainties associated with growing legitimate crops,
such as market factors, outweigh the risks of illicit
crop cultivation, where demand seems to be guaranteed.
He will also be concerned about the lack of
transportation to get his crops to market. His
paramount concern will be for his family's safety. For
Lincoln Kaye, "Of Cabbages and Cultures", "Savior or
Seducer?", Far Eastern Economic Review (13 Dec 1990) 35-37.
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years the drug barons have extracted an opium tax from
the farmers; unless law and order is restored to the
countryside few, if any, farmers will adopt a crop
substitution program.
The FAO outlines two approaches to crop
substitution. 15,4 One is the removal of drug crops
from the agricultural system, increasing output of
existing legal crops, and creating marketable surpluses
to offset income lost from the drug crops. This tactic
was used in the Bruner Project in northwest Pakistan,
where poppy-growing was replaced by increased
production of wheat, maize, sugarcane, and tobacco. 155
In China's Yunnan province--across the border from the
poppy growing region in Burma--alternative crops,
including rubber and tea, have successfully replaced
opium as the major crop in the region. The second
approach involves introducing new crops and varieties,
then selecting those which demonstrate the best
technological and market potential— this method was used
to a great extent in a crop substitution program in
northwestern Thailand. 15t This approach may not be as
154
"Crop Substitution: A Tactic to Reduce Drug Supply",
U.N. Chronicle (New York: Department of Public Information,
United Nations, Aug 1987), XIX.
155 IBID. , XIX.
' IBID. , XIX.
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readily acceptable to the local farmers because of the
greater risk factor involved. A coordinated effort must
assure the region's farmers that a market exists for the
new crops and they will receive an income for their
labor
.
The world community would have to provide support
for a project of this magnitude, for a decade or more,
until the commercial viability of drug crop substitution
has been demonstrated. Providing material assistance for
efforts to eliminate illegal drug cultivation and create
better alternatives is an important role for the United
States, and other government and private organizations to
play.
Either way, crop substitution must be seen as an
crucial component of a broader development effort
.
Areas under drug cultivation tend to have a low level of
development and primitive infrastructure. Creating
conditions for increased legal agricultural output is
going to require the construction of roads, irrigation
systems and power sources. Improving sanitation
facilities and health conditions will also need to be an
integral part of the overall program.
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B. OVERALL POLICY ISSUES
The United States is faced with the dilemma of
articulating its policy regarding Burma, as well as its
priorities for these policy programs. The issues at stake
include: (1) violations of human rights; (2) pro-democratic
reforms; (3) counter-narcotics operations; and (4) economic
and trade related issues. These four areas form the basis for
U.S. policy in Burma, and the priority of these issues will
decide which course of action the U.S. will take. Counter-
narcotics has already been addressed, as have the economic and
trade issues with relation to Burma's future. Neither of
these may form the basis of an overall policy given the
significance of the other two areas of concern. In light of
their importance, human rights and pro-democracy issues should
serve as the foundation of America's overall foreign policy in
Burma
.
1 . Human Rights
If the human rights policy continue to drive the
decision making process, then the U.S. Government will
not come to terms with the present regime until there is
full compliance with internationally recognized standards
of conduct. One of the primary objectives of U.S. human
rights policy is highly moral in nature--that is to
improve the quality of life of people in other countries.
This policy reflects an underlying American optimism
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about the human condition and an innate sense of idealism
in dealing with complex international problems.
Pursuit of these human rights causes is also
predicated on a somber appraisal of U.S. national
interests. It is believed that a government that seeks
to deny its people fundamental civil and political
rights is usually prone to aggression and habitually
exhibits ruthless and unpredictable behavior
internationally
.
While in the long term, the United States wants to
foster a better world order, the present human rights
policy stems from a pragmatic and realistic assessment
of the existing international system. As noted by
Secretary Shultz, "It is a tough-minded policy, which
faces the world as it is, not as Americans might wish or
imagine it to be. At the same time, it is an idealistic
policy which expresses the continuing commitment of the
United States to the cause of liberty and the alleviation
of suffering . " 157
Through bilateral channels the U.S. Government has
raised specific human rights cases and concerns. This
type of "quiet diplomacy" has often been very
successful and key to the resolution of various
Paula Dobriansky, "U.S. Human Rights Policy: An
Overview", Current Policy No. 1091 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, August 1988).
145
problems. However, as in the case of Burma, stronger
more forceful measures are required when this type of
diplomacy fails. Actions which tend to carry the
intended message include the issuance of strong public
statements of condemnation and the denial of economic
and military assistance. These punitive approaches are
intended to single out the violators of human rights,
while also providing inducements for them to improve
their record. 158
In light of the SLORC's documented brutality,
total disregard for human rights, its lack of
integrity, and shaky moral and ethical foundations, the
United States Government must continue its present
policy towards Burma. The present policy censures the
Burmese Government for its recent actions, and calls
for a world-wide embargo to force the SLORC to give up
power to the elected government. All U.S. assistance
and aid programs have been terminated. The past
narcotics assistance program has also ceased, with only
low-level contacts being maintained.
These actions alone are not enough of an
inducement for the SLORC to mend its ways. Other
countries have not stopped trade or aid to Burma because
it has not been in their interest to do so. The U.S.
lsa IBID.
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policy should take additional steps to ensure compliance
with a full trade embargo to force the change in
leadership. If aid and other concessions were to be
withheld from Burma's trading partners, in exchange for
compliance, more direct pressure could be brought to bear
on the SLORC.
2. Supporting Pro-democracy Movement
A powerful trend toward democratization, or at
least political liberalization, seems to be sweeping
much of the second and third world countries. Policy
makers and a variety of analysts argue that the United
States should support transitions to democracy because
that policy will lead to a more peaceful world, a world
more compatible with U.S. values, a world in which
support for the free market will enhance the prospects
for prosperity, a world in which citizens of third
world democracies will be treated more equitably and
have more of their basic human rights protected, and a
world in which the likelihood of political stability
will increase. 15 "
Policy arguments in support of democracy are
especially difficult to make because democracy is both
Robert L. Rothstein, "Democracy, Conflict, and
Development in the Third World", The Washington Quarterly
(Spring 1991) 43.
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an intermediate and terminal goal. That is, the United
States supports democracy partly because there is a
presumption that the creation of more democratic regimes
will lead to other results that are considered benefitial
for our own purposes. Other arguments have been made
that democratic regimes will be more peaceful and more
likely to support free market policies.
If democracy is to remain a mainstay of America's
foreign policy, then the U.S. must lend support to the
opposition forces to help topple the repressive regime
in power today. As indicated by the election results in
May of 1990, the people have cried out for democracy.
Just as the Thirty Comrades sought help from Japan, the
NLD and other opposition groups have sought help in the
United States. This country has much to offer in the way
of nation-building tools and assistance. Education
programs directed towards providing the country with
fundamental training in crucial areas: key industries,
banking and financial sectors, public works and
transportation systems, and other primary segments of a
modern society. The mending process cannot begin,
however, until the devastation and demise of Burma comes
to an end. The people of Burma must be helped to make
the next critical move.
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